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3Financial Stability Report 2019  
in a nutshell
Banks are essential to the economy and perform important tasks for society. Financial 
stability implies that banks and the rest of the financial system are able to perform these 
tasks adequately, even in the event of serious downturns and economic crises. 
High household debt levels and high property prices are the key financial system vulnera-
bilities in Norway. In Norges Bank’s assessment, these vulnerabilities have changed little 
over the past year, although debt growth and property price inflation have slowed.
Requirements for banks’ credit standards limit excessive borrowing by the most vulnerable 
households. Norges Bank is of the view that these requirements have functioned as intended 
and supports continuation of the regulation on new residential mortgage loans. 
Norwegian banks are currently profitable, solvent and have ample access to funding. The stress 
test in this year’s Report shows that banks may still amplify a downturn by lending less. To 
counter this, the authorities can lower the countercyclical capital buffer and allow banks to 
draw on the other buffers.
Global uncertainties, especially related to trade tensions and the UK’s relationship 
with the EU, pose risks to financial stability in Norway. Turbulence abroad can spread 
to Norway and be amplified by vulnerabilities in the domestic financial system.
Climate change and measures to mitigate climate change may result in losses and 
funding problems for banks. This entails risks to financial stability, which is why it 
is important for the financial sector to address climate risks in risk assessments. 
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Norges Bank’s financial stability reporting
In the annual Financial Stability Report, Norges Bank assesses vulnerabilities and risks in the financial system, 
with a focus on the long-term, structural features of banks, financial markets and the Norwegian economy that 
are of importance for financial stability. Norges Bank’s Monetary Policy Report with financial stability assessment 
includes an ongoing assessment of financial imbalances and the banking sector, Norges Bank’s monetary policy 
assessments and the decision basis for the countercyclical capital buffer for banks. In the Financial Infrastructure 
Report, Norges Bank assesses vulnerabilities and risks in the financial infrastructure. The report Norway’s  Financial 
System provides a comprehensive overview of Norway’s financial system, its tasks and the performance of these 
tasks.
The Executive Board discussed Financial Stability Report 2019 at its meeting on 18 September and 23 October.
Financial stability and Norges Bank’s role
Financial stability implies a financial system that is resilient to shocks and thus capable of channelling funds, 
executing payments and distributing risk efficiently. 
Financial stability is one of Norges Bank’s primary objectives in its work on promoting economic stability. Norges 
Bank’s tasks and responsibilities in this area are set out in Section 1 of the current Norges Bank Act, which states 
that the Bank shall “promote an efficient payment system domestically as well as vis-à-vis other countries”. 
Under the new Central Bank Act, Norges Bank shall “promote the stability of the financial system and an efficient 
and secure payment system” and “be an executive and advisory financial stability authority.”
Under the Payment Systems Act, Norges Bank is the licensing authority for interbank clearing and settlement 
systems. Norges Bank’s supervision and oversight of the financial infrastructure is discussed annually in the 
Financial Infrastructure Report.
The central bank can provide extraordinary liquidity to individual institutions in the financial sector or to the 
banking system when liquidity demand cannot be satisfied from alternative sources and there is a threat to 
financial stability. As lender of last resort, Norges Bank monitors the financial system as a whole, with particular 
focus on the risk of systemic failure.
The Ministry of Finance shall set the level of the countercyclical capital buffer four times a year. Norges Bank has 
been assigned responsibility for preparing a decision basis and providing advice to the Ministry regarding the 
level of the buffer. The decision basis is published four times a year as part of the Monetary Policy Report with 
financial stability assessment.
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In the Financial Stability Report, Norges Bank assesses vulnerabilities and risks in the Norwegian 
financial system and points to measures that can contribute to financial stability. The Executive 
Board discussed the content of the Report on 18 September and 23 October.
Financial system vulnerabilities in Norway have not changed substantially since the previous Report, 
which was published in October 2018. Household debt is high, and commercial and residential 
property prices are at high levels after rising sharply over a long period. However, over the past two 
years, debt growth and house price inflation have been more moderate than previously, and house 
prices have risen more slowly than disposable income. Over the past year, the rise in commercial 
property prices has also slowed, and household debt is now rising at close to the same rate as 
disposable income. Norwegian banks have maintained profitability and solvency and continue to 
have ample access to funding.
Global economic uncertainty poses a risk to financial stability in Norway. Events in the international 
economy and financial markets can spread to Norway, and the impact in Norway may be amplified 
by domestic financial system vulnerabilities. Two such contagion channels are Norwegian exports 
and banks’ foreign funding. The trade tensions between the US and China remain a source of 
uncertainty and the UK’s relationship with the EU remains unclarified. Over the past year, uncer-
tainties surrounding growth prospects abroad have led to a broad decline in interest rates.  Persistently 
low interest rates may give rise to high risk-taking and financial imbalances. So far, global uncer-
tainties have not had serious consequences for the Norwegian economy, and Norwegian banks 
have felt little impact, but this situation can change quickly.
On balance, the financial stability outlook is broadly unchanged since the 2018 Report.
The Norwegian authorities have implemented a number of measures to mitigate financial system 
vulnerabilities. Requirements for banks’ credit standards limit excessive borrowing by the most 
vulnerable households. The regulation on new residential mortgage loans, first introduced in 2015, 
was tightened in 2017 and has functioned as intended. Norges Bank is of the opinion that debt 
growth and housing market developments do not warrant material changes to the requirements 
and in a consultation response on 14 October supported continuation of the regulation. There are 
also signs that measures targeting the consumer credit market have dampened consumer debt 
growth. In addition, the registers of unsecured debts, which were introduced on 1 July, have given 
banks more complete data on which to base credit assessments. Such registers should also include 
information on collateralised loans to enable banks and loan applicants to easily obtain the full 
picture of a loan applicant’s debt situation.
Banks’ loss absorbency capacity in an economic downturn is important for financial stability. Banks’ 
capital and liquidity requirements have become considerably stricter following the financial crisis. 
The stress test in this Report shows that the capital buffers of the largest Norwegian banks as a 
whole are sufficient to absorb the losses associated with a hypothetical downturn in the Norwegian 
economy. Nevertheless, in such a situation, banks may still tighten lending, which may amplify the 
downturn. To counter a sudden fall in lending, the authorities can reduce the countercyclical capital 
buffer and allow banks to draw on the remaining buffers. In that case, banks should be given 
 sufficient time to rebuild the capital buffers.
Executive Board’s assessment
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In connection with the implementation of the remainder of the EU capital framework, many banks’ 
reported capital ratios will rise without this reflecting an improvement in solvency. Norges Bank is 
of the view that in the current situation, Norwegian banks’ capital levels should not be reduced. 
Structural systemic risk is high, particularly owing to high household leverage. Since the systemic 
risk buffer was introduced in 2013, banks have increased their property market exposures, and their 
cross-holding of covered bonds has also risen. In its consultation response on 30 September, Norges 
Bank supported as a countermeasure the proposal to increase the systemic risk buffer, an action 
that will help banks to maintain loss absorbency.
Financial stability considerations in each country should determine the scope of regulation, whether 
the lenders are domestic or foreign banks. Foreign banks’ share of the Norwegian market is high. 
It is therefore important that other countries recognise Norwegian regulations and vice versa.
digital vulnerabilities may result in a higher risk of operational problems. Cyber attacks are  becoming 
increasingly widespread and sophisticated. Moreover, the financial system depends on a few crit-
ical ICT service providers. This increases the risk that a cyber attack may pose a threat to financial 
stability. Finanstilsynet and Norges Bank have invited the industry and other relevant authorities 
to a dialogue to assess whether the European framework for Threat Intelligence-based Ethical Red 
Teaming (TIBER-EU) would be suited to Norway. In its consultation response on the ICT security 
bill, Norges Bank pointed out a need for further study of the best way to supervise critical ICT service 
providers and data centres.
Climate change and society’s adaptation to climate change will affect all segments of the economy 
and entail risks to financial stability. Changes in climate regulation, new technology and changing 
investor and consumer preferences may entail a transition risk for the Norwegian economy in the 
coming years, a risk amplified by the importance of the oil and gas industry for Norway. Climate 
change is a global challenge, which must primarily be addressed by the political authorities and 
instruments other than those available to central banks. Climate risk must be managed in the same 
way as other risks facing the financial sector. The instruments for strengthening banks’ resilience, 
such as capital requirements and prudential supervision, are thus basically the same as those used 
for managing other risks. Central banks and supervisory authorities can, within their mandates, 
promote financial stability by helping to pave the way for the financial sector to include climate risks 
in overall risk assessments and communicate relevant information and by ensuring adequate capital 
to support all risks.
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1.1 RISK OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS
Global turbulence can spread
The financial system largely operates across borders. 
Global turbulence and uncertainty may therefore 
spread to the financial system in Norway both from 
the global financial system and via the real economy. 
Small open economies like Norway are especially at 
risk. The IMF works to uncover financial sector vul-
nerabilities and provides advice on measures to 
address them (see box on page 9).
Large Norwegian banks obtain large amounts of 
funding abroad. At the same time, foreign banks 
account for around a quarter of all lending in Norway. 
Global financial turbulence may raise Norwegian banks’ 
funding costs and lower the supply of credit from 
foreign banks in Norway, both of which can reduce 
households’ and firms’ access to credit. Large firms 
that rely on the global bond market for financing may 
also be directly affected. Global turbulence has had 
little impact on Norwegian banks since the 2018 Report.
The European market is particularly important for the 
Norwegian economy. The situation at European banks 
is important for the European economy and may affect 
Norwegian banks’ funding markets. On the whole, Euro-
pean banks’ capital adequacy and liquidity coverage 
have improved considerably in recent years (Chart 1.1), 
but there are large differences across countries. The 
build-up of loss absorbency capacity appears to have 
come to a halt, and the average leverage ratio is lower 
for European banks than for Norwegian banks.1
1 In recent years, the average leverage ratio for EU banks has varied 
between 5.3% and 5.6% (see the EBA Risk dashboard).
1 Financial stability outlook
The key vulnerabilities in the financial system in Norway are high household debt, high house 
prices and high commercial property prices. Vulnerabilities have not changed substantially since 
Financial Stability Report 2018. Norwegian banks have maintained profitability and solvency 
and continue to have ample access to funding. Global economic uncertainty poses a risk to 
financial stability in Norway. Over the past year, uncertainties surrounding growth prospects 
abroad have led to a broad decline in interest rates. Persistently low interest rates may give rise 
to high risk-taking and financial imbalances. On balance, the financial stability outlook is little 
changed since the 2018 Report.
Since the financial crisis, the Norwegian authorities have introduced a number of measures to 
mitigate the risks in the financial system. The most important are stricter bank capital and 
liquidity requirements. Requirements for banks’ credit standards limit excessive borrowing by 
the most vulnerable households.
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A large share of Norwegian financial institutions’ set-
tlement takes place in foreign interbank systems, and 
large volumes of derivatives are cleared via UK central 
counterparties (CCPs). The UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU may entail challenges for these transactions. 
 Temporary measures allow Norwegian firms to partic-
ipate in UK CCPs even in the event of a no-deal Brexit.
Weaker growth expectations and lower foreign 
interest rates
Uncertainties surrounding trade tensions and the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU have weighed on growth 
prospects for Norway’s trading partners (see  Monetary 
Policy Report 3/19). So far, there are few signs that 
global uncertainties have damped growth in Norwe-
gian exports. In August, enterprises in Norges Bank s´ 
Regional Network reported continued solid export 
growth, despite increased uncertainties and Brexit- 
related turbulence.
Global markets have long priced in monetary policy 
normalisation and higher global interest rates, but 
the uncertain global outlook has contributed to a 
sharp fall in risk-free long-term interest rates, which 
are now at very low levels in some countries (Chart 
1.2). Central bank measures have also contributed to 
lower interest rates. Around 30% of advanced 
economy sovereign bonds outstanding are now 
trading at negative yields.2 In a number of countries, 
new long-term corporate and household loans are 
now available at negative interest rates.
Following the global financial crisis in 2008, lower 
interest rates have contributed to higher non-financial 
2 See International Monetary Fund (2019) “Global Financial Stability Report, 
October 2019”.
sector debt. Corporates have increased debt by nearly 
20% of global GdP since 2008. This debt will be more 
vulnerable if firms’ debt servicing capacity is weak-
ened in pace with weaker growth prospects. Global 
public debt has also risen substantially, while house-
hold debt is little changed. Since 2016, the global total 
debt-to-GdP ratio has levelled off, for both the public 
sector and non-financial enterprises.
Low returns on low-risk investments have for some time 
contributed to higher prices for securities and real 
estate. Global equity prices are broadly at the same level 
as one year ago (Chart 1.3). Lower growth prospects 
have pulled down equity prices, while lower interest 
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IMF ASSESSMENT OF THE 
NORWEGIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The global financial system is interconnected. 
Through the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
works to uncover vulnerabilities among its 
members. On the basis of FSAP findings, the IMF 
issues advice on measures to strengthen the 
financial system in each jurisdiction and reduce 
the risk of cross border contagion of financial 
distress. The IMF performs thorough analyses of 
the most important jurisdictions, including 
Norway, every five years. The results of an 
ongoing FSAP assessment of Norway will proba-
bly be published in the course of 2020 Q2.
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rates have pushed them up. Global house price inflation 
has been high since the financial crisis (Chart 1.4).
Low interest rates over a longer period may weaken 
the financial stability outlook because they fuel 
increased debt accumulation and asset price inflation.
1.2 VULNERABILITIES IN THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM IN NORWAY
The key vulnerabilities in the financial system in 
Norway are high household debt, high house prices 
and high commercial property prices (see box on page 
11). vulnerabilities have not changed substantially 
since the 2018 Report.
Over the past three years, growth in the Norwegian 
economy has been solid. The global upturn, low inter-
est rates, improved cost-competitiveness, largely 
owing to a weaker krone, and higher oil prices have 
given a boost to activity.
Stable net interest income and low credit losses have 
enabled the large Norwegian banks to maintain prof-
itability over the past year. All Norwegian banks 
satisfy the capital requirements. Further ahead, the 
risk of higher losses among oil-related companies and 
stronger competition from foreign banks and other 
operators could pose a threat to profitability.
High household debt
vulnerabilities related to household debt are high and 
broadly unchanged since the 2018 Report. High house-
hold debt will amplify the negative outcome of a 
sudden and sharp movement in interest rates, house 
prices or household income. Most households have 
room to defer principal repayments, draw on financial 
buffers or tighten consumption if they are exposed to 
economic shocks. The danger that a large number of 
households will tighten consumption at the same time 
constitutes a systemic risk. This may reduce firms’ 
earnings and debt-servicing capacity, leading in turn 
to higher losses on banks’ corporate exposures.
Household debt has long risen faster than household 
income, resulting in increasing household leverage 
(Chart 1.5). Household debt-to-income ratios are now 
showing signs of levelling off. Over the past few years, 
debt growth has edged down, while growth in house-
hold disposable income has risen. The higher interest 
rate level and continued moderate house price infla-
tion are expected to restrain debt growth further (see 
Monetary Policy Report 3/19).
The latest available data at individual level show an 
increase in the share of highly leveraged households 
(debt above five times gross income) and low 
debt-servicing capacity (annual margin below one 
month’s income) between 2016 and 2017 (Chart 1.6). 
Especially among first-time buyers, there was a large 
share that assumed debt corresponding to a debt-to-
income (dTI) ratio of above five in 2017 (see box on 
page 18). dTIs also rose for households that were not 
active in the housing market, many of whom experi-
enced a fall in income. The share of households 
“underwater” (net debt higher than their dwelling’s 
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Chart 1.6 Debt held by vulnerable households1). Share of total household 
debt. Percent. 1987 – 2017
1) Households in breach of critical values for debt-to-income ratio (debt over five times 
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market value) was broadly unchanged. The data 
suggest that the number of vulnerable households 
increased between 2016 and 2017. Since then more 
moderate credit growth and house price inflation has 
been observed, which may indicate a slowdown in 
the build-up of vulnerabilities.
Interest burdens, ie the share of income used to 
service interest on debt, are historically low owing to 
low lending rates (Chart 1.7). After the interest rate 
hikes over the past year, interest burdens have risen 
slightly. Owing to high debt levels, interest rate 
increases have a greater impact on household inter-
est burdens than before. debt service ratios, ie the 
share of income used to service interest and normal 
principal repayments, are already high and at the 
same level as prior to the financial crisis in 2008 and 
the banking crisis in the 1990s. debt service ratios 
signal high risk in the heatmap (see box on page 13).
Consumer debt accounts for only 3%-4% of total 
household debt. Households with large consumer debt 
are therefore faced with high interest burdens owing 
to the high interest rates and consumer credit. default 
rates on consumer debt are high and rising (Chart 1.8). 
More restrictive credit standards and reduced house 
price inflation may result in increased defaults among 
persons needing to refinance maturing consumer debt. 
KEY FINANCIAL SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES IN NORWAY
KEY VULNERABILITIES IN NORWAY
Change since   
Financial Stability Report 2018
High household debt
High house prices
High commercial property prices
There are three vulnerability levels, of which red is the highest nnn
The arrows indicate whether vulnerabilities have increased, decreased or remained unchanged since the 2018 Report.
The table above shows Norges Bank’s assessment of the key vulnerabilities in the Norwegian financial system. 
Vulnerabilities can be time-varying or the result of permanent structural conditions in the financial system. 
Vulnerabilities can cause or amplify financial turbulence and an economic downturn when the economy is 
exposed to large shocks. The interaction between shocks and vulnerabilities can result in financial crises that 
restrain economic growth. Shocks that trigger financial crises can be difficult for the authorities to predict and 
influence. Shocks to a small open economy like Norway will often originate in other countries.
The vulnerability assessment is based on historical experience of what causes downturns and financial turbu-
lence and assessments of new features of the financial system. The vulnerabilities identified as key vulnerabil-
ities may change over time.
If vulnerabilities are categorised as orange or red, Norges Bank will consider issuing advice on measures to 
address them. These may be measures aimed at reducing the vulnerabilities directly or increasing financial 
system resilience. The authorities have already implemented a number of measures (Table 1.1).
Owing to high household indebtedness and house price overvaluation, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
has issued a warning to Norway,1 in which it points out that the vulnerabilities are a source of systemic risk to 
the financial system.
1 See “Warning of the European Systemic Risk Board of 27 June 2019 on medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sector of Norway”. 
(ESRB/2019/14).
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Information from the new credit registers shows that 
there are many with little consumer debt, while rela-
tively few owe large amounts (see box on page 20). 
Growth in consumer credit to Norwegian households 
has long been high and rising, but has slowed since 
peaking in 2016.3 Lower growth reflects in part the 
introduction by the authorities in recent years of a 
number of measures to regulate consumer credit.4 The 
consumer credit regulation and credit registers may 
curb consumer credit growth further.
The credit registers provide details on an individual’s 
unsecured debt. Norges Bank recommends enlarging 
the registers to include information on secured debt. 
This will provide a more comprehensive picture of a 
loan applicant’s debt situation.
Moderate house price inflation reduces 
housing market vulnerabilities
High house prices are a key financial system vulnera-
bility in Norway. Sharp and sudden declines in house 
prices may trigger tightening of household consump-
tion and result in increased losses on banks’ loan port-
folios. The covered bond market may also be weak-
ened. This may create bank funding shocks (see 
Section 2 Bank profitability, solvency and funding).
House prices have risen sharply over a long period and 
in nominal terms are at historically high levels. Over the 
past two years, the rise has been moderate, and house 
prices relative to household disposable income have 
moved lower (Chart 1.9). The cooling-off of the housing 
market has reduced the risk of a sudden and more pro-
nounced price fall further out, and vulnerabilities have 
declined somewhat since the 2018 Report.
The recent moderate house price inflation may partly 
reflect increased residential construction.5 There was 
a record number of completions in 2018, and a new 
peak in the number of completions is expected in 2019 
(Chart 1.10). Higher interest rates and the tightening 
of the regulation on new residential mortgage loans 
have also likely pulled down house price inflation.
3 The decline in lending growth in Finanstilsynet’s sample of consumer 
credit institutions would have been smaller if it had been corrected for the 
sale of portfolios of non-performing consumer debt.
4 See Financial Stability Report 2018, page 16, for a summary of measures 
aimed at the consumer credit market.
5 For a long time, residential construction activity was lower than warranted 
by the increase in the number of households in isolation. So that even 
though residential construction activity appears to be high now, it does 
not appear to be excessive (see Mæhlum, S., P.M. Pettersen and H. xu 
(2018) “Residential construction and household formation”. Staff Memo 
12/2018. Norges Bank.
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Moderate house price inflation is expected to con-
tinue ahead (see Monetary Policy Report 3/19). Higher 
interest rates and the large number of completions 
pull down the rise in house prices. Prospects for con-
tinued high demand for housing in urbanised areas 
and higher wage growth pull in the opposite direction. 
A more moderate rise in house prices may help 
restrain the build-up of household debt ahead.
High commercial property prices
vulnerabilities associated with high commercial prop-
erty prices are broadly unchanged since the 2018 
Report. In recent years, the rise in prices for commercial 
property in Oslo has been high, and real estate com-
panies’ debt has risen. This has contributed to higher 
vulnerabilities for banks. Norwegian banks’ have size-
able exposures to commercial real estate (CRE) (see 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HEATMAP
Norges Bank’s heatmap1 is one of a number of tools for assessing systemic risk in the Norwegian financial 
system. The heatmap monitors a broad set of indicators in three main areas: risk appetite and asset valuations, 
non-financial (household and corporate) sector vulnerabilities and financial sector vulnerabilities. Its primary 
objective is to measure cyclical or time-varying movements in vulnerabilities, and to a lesser extent vulnera-
bilities associated with structural aspects of the financial system or the wider economy.
Developments in the indicators are mapped onto a common colour coding scheme, where a green (red) colour 
reflects low (high) levels of vulnerability. The heatmap signals vulnerabilities in three segments of the financial 
system:
• Commercial property prices have risen sharply over many years. The gap between actual price developments 
and trend has therefore been and remains positive and relatively wide.2
• Household debt service ratios (interest and estimated principal payments on loan debt to after-tax income) 
are high.
• Assets and lending associated with institutions other than banks and mortgage companies3 have shown 
strong growth. Mutual funds’ assets have risen in recent years, partly owing to increased subscriptions by 
insurance companies and pension funds. Insurance companies in particular have seen strong lending growth, 
though levels remain low. Vulnerabilities are therefore not considered to be elevated.
1 See Arbatli, E.C. and R.M. Johansen (2017) “A Heatmap for Monitoring Systemic Risk in Norway“, Staff Memo 10/2017, Norges Bank, for a detailed 
 description of the heatmap and the individual indicators.
2 See Norges Bank´s website: “Indicators of financial imbalances” for an illustration of the gaps.
3 Financial institutions other than banks and mortgage companies comprise money market mutual funds, other mutual funds, finance companies, 
 government lending institutions, insurance companies and pension funds.
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Section 3 Stress test). Even though in normal times, 
losses have been historically been low, CRE is the sector 
that has inflicted the most losses during crises.
Estimated real selling prices for prime office space in 
Oslo have been rising sharply over several years 
(Chart 1.11). Over the past year, the rise has been more 
moderate. Selling prices are estimated using rental 
prices and an estimated yield.
In isolation, rising rental prices strengthen the 
debt-servicing capacity of CRE companies. Rents for 
prime office space in central Oslo have risen sharply 
over the past few years (Chart 1.12). In other parts of 
Oslo, average rental prices have risen, but the rise 
has been lower than for prime office space. Norges 
Bank has developed a rental price index that takes 
into account that rent depends on the attractiveness 
of the office space (see box on page 22). This quality- 
adjusted index confirms that rents for the most attrac-
tive office space have risen more sharply in recent 
years than what could be considered representative 
for Oslo. According to Entra’s consensus report, 
market participants expect rents to continue to rise 
in Oslo, though at a slower pace than in 2019.
In line with falling interest rates, investors’ yields on 
CRE in Oslo fell over many years (Chart 1.13). In recent 
years, yields have been relatively stable. At the begin-
ning of the year, market participants expected yields 
to gradually pick up in pace with the rise in long-term 
interest rates. When instead, long rates fell both 
abroad and in Norway, yield expectations also weak-
ened somewhat. Market participants expect yields to 
remain broadly unchanged ahead.
Overall, market participants’ expectations regarding 
rental price increases and yields suggest a further slight 
rise in selling prices in 2019 and 2020, but at a more 
moderate pace (see Monetary Policy Report 3/19).
Other important vulnerabilities
Digitalisation adds to vulnerabilities
Norway is at the forefront in the use of digital financial 
services. This makes the financial system vulnerable 
to unintended operational incidents and cyber 
attacks. The latter are becoming increasingly wide-
spread and sophisticated. If the financial system lacks 
the capacity to absorb shocks, rectify faults and 
ensure continuity of important economic functions, 
this may result in economic costs that may weaken 
confidence in the financial system.
Examples from the non-financial sector serve to illus-
trate how digital vulnerabilities may give rise to sub-
stantial losses. So far, there have been no extensive 
disruptions in the financial system in Norway, and the 
data for estimating the cost of malicious attacks and 
operational incidents are therefore limited. This also 
makes it a challenge to assess both the level of and 
changes in digital vulnerabilities.
Extensive outsourcing has resulted in the concentra-
tion of ICT operation and development in the hands 
of a small number of service providers. This entails 
a concentration risk that is difficult to manage for 
the individual financial market infrastructure owner. 
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A disruption among critical ICT service providers may 
affect important components of the payment system 
and other critical functions.
Climate risk also impacts the financial system
Climate change and society’s response to it may 
affect all parts of the economy and entail risks to 
financial stability. Climate risk is associated with both 
the physical consequences of climate change and the 
consequences of transitioning to a low-carbon 
economy. In Norway, the oil and gas industry will be 
the most relevant source of transition-related credit 
risk Norge. In recent years, Norwegian banks have 
reduced their oil sector exposures, but the oil indus-
try is still important (see Section 4 Climate risk).
Large losses for the banking sector overall are not 
likely before a structural decline in oil-related activities 
results in significant spillovers to the wider economy. 
In addition, other industries currently subject to low 
or no carbon pricing may be at risk if carbon pricing 
or emissions standards are introduced or increased. 
Banks are particularly vulnerable if such spillover 
effects affect loans secured on real estate, which 
constitute the largest share of banks’ exposures.
1.3 MEASURES TO MITIGATE 
VULNERABILITIES
Following the financial crisis, there has been broad 
international cooperation to increase financial system 
resilience. A range of measures have been introduced 
in Norway (see Table 1.1), with many others being 
formulated or amended.
Banks
Proposal to increase the systemic risk buffer
Some parts of the EU capital rules (CRR/CRd Iv) have 
not been introduced in Norway, but are now set for 
inclusion in the EEA Agreement and Norwegian law. 
These rules will likely enter into force during 2019, and 
Norwegian and European rules will become more 
harmonised. The changes will allow banks to report 
higher capital ratios without raising solvency levels. 
In June, the Ministry of Finance circulated for 
comment proposed adjustments to the requirements, 
including increasing the systemic risk buffer from 3% 
to 4.5%. In its consultation response6, Norges Bank 
supported the increase (see Section 2 Bank profita­
bility, solvency and funding).
Recovery and resolutions plans being finalised
On 1 January 2019, new bank recovery and resolution 
rules for Norwegian banks in line with the EU frame-
work entered into force. These rules are intended to 
provide a solid framework for managing troubled 
banks. Finanstilsynet intends to finalise recovery 
and resolution plans for the nine most important 
 Norwegian banks by year-end. The resolution and 
recovery plan for each bank will set minimum require-
ments for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) (See 
Section 2 Bank profitability, solvency and funding).
6 See Norges Banks høringssvar om tilpasninger i kapitalkravene for banker 
[Norges Banks consultation response on adjustments to banks’ capital 
requirements]. 30 September 2019 (in Norwegian only).
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Households
Proposal to tighten the regulation on residential 
mortgage loans
The regulation on requirements for new residential 
mortgage loans7 is intended to mitigate the risk of a 
substantial increase in debt among particularly vul-
nerable households. In September, the Ministry of 
Finance circulated for comment a proposal by Finan-
stilsynet to retain the regulation. Finanstilsynet rec-
ommends tightening the maximum debt-to-income 
(dTI) ratio (from 5 to 4.5) and the flexibility quota 
provision (from 10% to 5%), and repeal the Oslo- 
specific requirements. In its consultation response8, 
Norges Bank supported retaining the regulation, appli-
cation for an indefinite period of time and nationally 
consistent requirements. In Norges Bank’s opinion, 
the maximum dTI requirement should not be changed.
Regulation on consumer credit introduced
The authorities have issued a new regulation on 
prudent standards for new consumer credit (Regula-
tion on requirements for financial institutions’ con-
sumer credit standards9), which entered into force in 
February 2019 and will remain in force until the end 
of 2020. The requirements in the consumer credit 
regulation largely echo the requirements in the reg-
ulation on requirements for new residential mortgage 
loans. A potential tightening of the maximum dTI in 
the latter regulation may therefore also have conse-
quences for the former.
Credit registers have been established
The debt Information Act is intended to improve the 
credit assessments of financial institutions that lend 
to retail customers and prevent debt problems from 
arising. From 1 July 2019, financial institutions are 
required on a daily basis to report debt information 
to credit registers on retail customers with unsecured 
debt.
Financial infrastructure
Strengthening cybersecurity10
To enhance cyber resilience and promote financial 
stability, the European Central Bank (ECB) the Euro-
7 See Forskrift om krav til nye utlån med pant i bolig (boliglånsforskriften) 
[Regulation on requirements for new residential mortgage loans]  
(in Norwegian only)
8 See Norges Bank’s consultation response – Assessment of the regulation 
on requirements for new residential mortgage loans. 14 October 2019.
9 See Forskrift om krav til finansforetakenes utlånspraksis for forbrukslån 
[Regulation on requirements for financial institutions’ consumer credit 
standards] (In Norwegian only).
10 See Financial Infrastructure Report 2019, page 21.
pean framework for Threat Intelligence-based Ethical 
Red Teaming (TIBER-EU) for testing financial institu-
tions’ detection, protection and response capabilities 
against sophisticated cyber attacks. Several neigh-
bouring countries, including denmark and Sweden, 
have introduced or are preparing to introduce TIB-
ER-EU. Finanstilsynet and Norges Bank have invited 
the industry and relevant authorities to a dialogue to 
assess the suitability of introducing TIBER-EU in 
Norway.11
Over the past year, a number of international organ-
isations have published further cyber security guide-
lines and frameworks. On 24 September 2019, the 
IMF published the report Cybersecurity Risk Super­
vision12. EU has introduced the EU Cybersecurity Act. 
Work is also ongoing at the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) to understand systemic cyber risk in the 
EU and assess whether cyber incidents may pose a 
financial stability threat. Norges Bank is participating 
in this work.
Follow-up of concentration risk, supervision and 
contingency arrangements
The ICT Security Commission, which presented its 
report in december 2018, has proposed measures to 
enhance the organisation and regulation of national 
ICT security.13 In its consultation response to the 
 Ministry of Justice and Public Security, recommends 
further study of concentration risk, supervisory 
frameworks and contingency arrangements with a 
view to making specific proposals to address them 
(see Financial Infrastructure Report 2019).
Strengthening back-up arrangements for cash
Electronic contingency arrangements are the first line 
of defence in the event of a disruption in the payment 
system. Cash is a part of overall contingency prepar-
edness. In 2018, the Ministry of Finance laid down a 
regulation14 to clarify banks’ obligation to supply cash 
in a contingency situation. For cash to function in a 
11 See Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet (2019) “Norges Bank og Finanstilsy-
net ber om innspill til ev. innføring av rammeverk for testing av cybersik-
kerhet i Norge” [Norges Bank and Finanstilsynet request input on the pos-
sible introduction of cyber security testing framework in Norway]. Letter 
to the industry. 10 October 2019 (in Norwegian only).
12 See Gaidosch, T., F. Adelmann, A. Morozova and C. Wilson (2019) “Cyber-
security Risk Supervision”. Departmental Paper 19/15. IMF.
13 See Official Norwegian Reports (NOU) 2018:14. IKT­sikkerhet i alle ledd — 
Organisering og regulering av nasjonal IKT­sikkerhet [ICT security at every 
stage – Organisation and regulation of national ICT security] (ICT Security 
Commission) (in Norwegian only).
14 See Forskrift om endring i forskrift 9. desember 2016 nr. 1502 om finans­
foretak og finanskonsern.[Regulation to amend Regulation of 9 december 
2016 No 1502 on financial institutions and financial groups] (in Norwegian 
only).
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contingency, it must also be available and easy to use 
in a normal situation as well. Norges Bank is of the 
opinion that the current provision of cash services is 
not fully satisfactory and that a regulation governing 
the provision of cash services in a normal situation is 
needed.15
15 See Norges Bank (2019) “Bankenes tilbud av kontanttjenester – behov for 
regulering i forskrift” [Banks’ provision of cash services – need for a regu-
lation]. Letter from Norges Bank to Finanstilsynet, 13 February 2019.
Table 1.1 Important measures to mitigate financial system vulnerabilities in Norway
Category Instrument
First 
introd-
uced Current level
Credit standards 
requirements for 
mortgages
Tolerate higher interest rate (stress test)1
Loan-to-value (LTv) ratio
Principal repayment requirement
debt-to-income (dTI)1 ratio
Flexibility quota / “speed limit”2
20153
20153
20153
2017
2015
5 percentage points
85% (60% for loans secured on secondary 
homes in Oslo)
2.5% annually with LTv above 60%
5 times gross income
10% (8% or up to NOK 10m for loans 
secured on dwellings in Oslo)
Credit standards 
requirements for 
consumer credit4
Tolerate higher interest rate (stress test)1
Principal repayment requirement
debt-to-income (dTI)1 ratio
Flexibility quota / “speed limit”2
20193
20193
20193
2019
5 percentage points
Monthly principal repayment,
maximum term 5 years
5 times gross income
5%
Weighted capital 
requirements5
(share of risk-
weighted assets6)
Pillar 1 Minimum CET1 requirement
Pillar 1 Minimum Tier 1 requirement
Pillar 1 Minimum regulatory capital
Pillar 1  Combined buffer requirements: 
Capital conservation buffer 
Systemic risk buffer 
Buffer for systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs) 
Countercyclical capital buffer
Pillar 2 requirements
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2015
2015
2016
4.5%
6%
8%
2.5%
3%
2%
2%
varies across banks
Unweighted capital 
requirements5
(share of exposure 
measure)
Leverage ratio 2017 3% minimum requirement + 2% buffer 
requirement + 1% buffer requirement for 
systemically important banks
Liquidity 
requirements
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
LCR in individual currencies
LCR in NOK
2015
2017
2017
100%
100%
50% (for banks with EUR/USd as significant 
currencies)
Minimum 
requirement for 
own funds and 
eligible liabilities 
(MREL)7
Loss absorption amount
Amount necessary for recapitalisation8
2019
2019
Minimum requirement for regulatory capital
+ Pillar 2 requirements + combined buffer 
requirements
Minimum requirement for regulatory capital
+ Pillar 2 requirements + combined buffer 
requirements excluding countercyclical 
capital buffer requirement 
1 The requirement pertains to the customer’s total debt.
2 Up to a certain percentage of the total value of new mortgage loans/consumer credit granted each quarter may be loans in breach of one or more of the requirements.
3 Prior to being laid down in a regulation, the requirements were issued as guidelines, for residential mortgage loans in 2010 and for consumer credit in 2017.
4 Exemption for credit cards with credit limits below NOK 25 000 and exemption for loan refinancing as long as the value of the refinanced loan (and associated 
costs) does not exceed the value of the existing loan (and associated costs).
5 See explanation of capital requirements in Norway’s Financial System 2019, pages 86–88.
6 A number of regulations have been introduced for banks’ calculation of risk weights, especially for residential mortgage loans.
7 Liabilities eligible for MREL must be lower in priority than senior debt. Equity capital used to meet the combined buffer requirement under Pillar 1 may not be 
used at the same time to meet MREL. This ensures that the buffers can function as intended.
8 Pertains only to banks subject to resolution and not liquidation under public administration.
Sources: Finanstilsynet and Ministry of Finance
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HIGHER SHARE OF HIGHLY LEVERAGED HOUSEHOLDS
The share of households with debt exceeding five times gross income rose between 2016 and 2017. The 
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio for many first-time buyers was above five. Also in groups not active in the housing 
market there were households whose DTI rose to high levels, many of whom at the same time experienced 
a fall in income. Most debt is held by households in higher income deciles.
Debt accumulation is a function of homebuying
Household debt is closely linked to adjustments to the housing market. By combining household income and 
wealth data with data for home sales, we can study debt developments in various household groups. First-time 
buyers are generally more highly leveraged (higher debt relative to gross income) than other households 
(Chart 1.A). Other recent homebuyers are also highly leveraged. Among households who have not recently 
purchased a home, DTI ratios fall with age. The median pensioner and non-owner household holds little debt.
High-income households can be more highly leveraged than lower-income households and yet better able to 
make payments. In most household groups, most of the debt is held by households in higher income deciles 
(Chart 1.B). This is particularly evident among buy-to-let investors in secondary homes. The exceptions are 
first-time buyers, pensioners and renters. First-time buyers are young households that can generally expect 
higher income growth than older households.
Households that purchased a home in 2016 or 2017 account for close to 5% of all households and hold approx-
imately 10% of total debt (Table 1.A). Homeowners who have not recently purchased a home in the past two 
years hold close to 80% of total debt. Renters and others, who account for nearly a third of households, hold 
the remaining 10%.
Table 1.A. Household groups.1 2017
Category Age Relationship with housing market
Percent 
of all 
Percent of 
total debt
First-time buyers 20–34 Purchased in 2017.
Not registered as owning in the two 
 previous years.
1.1 2.0
Recent homebuyers 
 (excluding first-time buyers)
20–90 Purchased in 2016 or 2017 and registered 
as owning in these years.
3.1 7.5
younger owners 20–90 Registered as owning in 2016–2017,  
but did not purchase in these years.
19.7 36.4
Older owners 20–44 Registered as owning in 2016–2017,  
but did not purchase in these years.
25.0 31.0
Pensioners 45–64 Registered as owning in 2016–2017,  
but did not purchase in these years.  
Pension primary income source.
16.2 5.7
Secondary homeowners 65–90 Registered as a secondary homeowner 
and with rental income.
2.5 6.2
Renters 20–90 Not registered as owning in 2016–2017. 27.5 7.2
Others 20–90 4.9 4.1
1 Groups are mutually exclusive. Self-employed persons and some outliers have been omitted. The sample comprises 2.2m households in 2017.
Sources: Ambita, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
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DTIs rose between 2016 and 2017
Between 2016 and 2017, DTIs rose in all household groups except for renters. In this period, there was a rise in 
the share of households with a DTI above five and in the share of debt held by these households (Chart 1.C).
The DTIs of around 2% of the households rose from below five in 2016 to above five in 2017 (Chart 1.D). Close 
to 40% of them are homeowners who are not recent homebuyers. For a large proportion of these home owners, 
a fall in income pushed up their DTI. Among first-time buyers and other recent homebuyer households, a far 
smaller share experienced a fall in income at the same time as their DTI increased to above five.
In 2017, a requirement for a maximum DTI of five was added to the regulation on new residential mortgage loans. 
Banks’ reporting to Finanstilsynet1 indicates that a substantial portion of the flexibility quota in the regulation 
is used for loans that breach the maximum DTI and that priority is given to young homebuyers. A number of 
banks have also stated they give priority to existing customers experiencing a change in circumstances, such 
as a divorce etc. This contributes to a larger proportion with a DTI above five among these household groups. 
According to calculations using the combined data from Statistics Norway and Ambita, a good 25% of first-time 
buyers took on debt corresponding to a DTI above five in 2017.
1 See Finanstilsynet’s consultation response on the regulation on new residential mortgage loans, 10 September 2019 (in Norwegian only).
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CREDIT REGISTER DATA SHOW UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMER DEBT
Credit register data show that around a quarter of the population had consumer debt in one form or 
another at the end of September 2019. Consumer debt is unevenly distributed. Most consumer loans are 
small, but for a small minority, consumer debt was very large.
From 1 July 2019, financial institutions must report unsecured personal loans to the credit registers. The credit 
registers provide details on an individual’s unsecured debt. The registers record all debts not secured by a 
registered security interest. Credit registers enable financial institutions to make a more accurate assessment 
of a borrower’s creditworthiness, and give borrows easier access to details regarding their own debts. The 
authorities also obtain a more granular overview of the overall vulnerabilities and risks associated with  unsecured 
debt in Norway.
To distinguish consumer debt from other unsecured debt1 “consumer debt” is restricted here to debt carrying an 
interest rate above 8%. Consumer debt consists of instalment loans with a contractual repayment period and credit 
card debt. Credit card holders can draw on a line of credit up to an agreed limit without needing creditor approval. 
Amounts drawn are often interest-free until after a grace period. At the end of September, the average credit card 
holder had drawn on around 30% of the total credit line available. Approximately 30% of the amount drawn was 
interest-free. Interest-free balances are assumed to be payment transactions and are not a part of consumer debt.
Many have consumer debt – just a few owe very large amounts
In principle, access to consumer credit is a good that gives households financial flexibility. According to the 
credit register, consumer debt outstanding accounted for around 3.5% of total domestic household debt at the 
end of September. A good quarter of the population over age 18 had interest-bearing consumer debt. Among 
the youngest and oldest age cohorts, there are far fewer with consumer debt (Chart 1.E).
Consumer debt is unevenly distributed. Half of borrowers had consumer debt balances of NOK 25 000 or less, but 
all together they held below 5% of total consumer debt (Chart 1.F). Nearly all balances below NOK 25 000 comprise 
credit card debt (Chart 1.G). A quarter of borrowers had balances of between NOK 25 000 and NOK 100 000. This 
debt is also predominantly credit card balances. The last quarter had balances of above NOK 100 000, primarily in 
the form of instalment loans. Instalment loans account for around 60% of total consumer debt.
Low-value debt carries high interest rates and is repaid quickly
Consumer loans that are repaid after a short period have a limited total cost. Nevertheless, if the loan balance 
is large relative to income, covering interest expenses may be difficult. Once a borrower runs into repayment 
difficulties, interest compounding can quickly magnify the problem. Interest rates above 8% are high compared 
with a typical residential mortgage rate of around 3%. A considerable share of loan balances outstanding carried 
an interest rate far higher than 8% (Chart 1.H).
Nearly 20% of those with loan or credit card balances under NOK 50 000 at the beginning of September had 
repaid them by the beginning of October (Chart 1.I). For those with loan balances above NOK 100 000, under 
1% had repaid the entire balance in the following month.
Consumer credit banks extend the most credit
Financial institutions that specialise in consumer financing – “consumer credit banks” – accounted for over half of 
total consumer credit at the end of September (Chart 1.J). Financial institutions where consumer financing is only one 
of several products – “traditional banks” – accounted for around one-third of consumer credit. Consumer credit banks 
and traditional banks both sell portions of their non-performing credit card and loan portfolios to finance companies 
that specialise in purchasing non-performing debt. Such finance companies held 10% of total consumer debt.
1 The data have been obtained from Gjeldsregisteret AS. Not all unsecured debt is consumer debt. For example, banks provide bridge financing in 
 connection with home purchases as an unsecured loan at a relatively low interest rate under the assumption that collateral will be pledged within a short 
time. Many of the largest loans in the credit register carry an interest rate of below 5%.
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NEW RENTAL PRICE INDEX FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE IN OSLO
Norges Bank has long used selling prices for prime office space in Oslo as an important indicator of devel-
opments in financial imbalances. However, limited availability of data has made it difficult to assess whether 
price developments in this segment are representative of the overall commercial real estate market. On 
the basis of an enlarged dataset, the Bank has developed a quality-adjusted rental price index that indicates 
a higher rise in rental prices for prime office space in the recent period than for the office space market in 
Oslo as a whole.
The commercial real estate (CRE) market is important for financial stability. However, available data are limited 
and of varying quality. Norges Bank therefore uses several sources to obtain the best possible overview of 
developments in the sector. Important market indicators are yield, rental and selling prices. Selling prices for 
prime office space in Oslo is regarded to be a particularly important indicator of CRE market vulnerabilities, 
because these prices have historically risen sharply ahead of financial crises. Selling prices are estimated as 
rental prices divided by yield. The yield for prime office space in Oslo is often used as a benchmark for pricing 
other office space. Even though prime office space in Oslo is an important segment, it will not necessarily 
provide a representative picture of sector developments.
A new quality-adjusted index shows differences in rental price developments
In its work to improve the basis for its CRE sector analyses, the Bank has developed quality-adjusted rental 
indexes for office space in Oslo. The indexes are calculated with the aid of rental price data based on actual 
leases that cover a large part of the office market in Oslo.1 Quality-adjusted indexes result in more comparable 
rental prices than indexes based on average rents.2 Average rents are affected by whether a relative large 
number of leases have been signed for attractively located or high-quality office space, for example. Differences 
in such attributes should not influence a rental price index, and the quality-adjusted index takes this into account. 
For Oslo as a whole, the quality-adjusted index shows a somewhat more pronounced rise prior to the financial 
crisis and weaker price developments in the period 2013 to 2015 than developments in the average (Chart 1.K).
To assess whether developments in the established rental price index for prime office space in Oslo are repre-
sentative, they were compared with the quality-adjusted rental indexes for Oslo and for Aker Brygge-Vika (Chart 
1.L). The Aker Brygge-Vika index covers broadly the same geographical area as the established index but also 
includes less attractive office space. All indexes have moved in the same direction since 2005. However, the 
established index fluctuated more around the time of the financial crisis and has recently shown a sharper rise 
than both quality-adjusted indexes.
1 The data are collected by the company Arealstatistikk.
2 See Anundsen, A. and M. Hagen (2019): “Hedonic indices for rental prices in the Oslo office market” Forthcoming Working Paper. Norges Bank. The index 
is hedonic, which means that rental prices depend on a number of attributes that must be controlled in order to make these prices comparable. The 
rental price index is calculated as the relationship between two equally attractive offices at time t compared with the base year.
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SHOULD A CBDC BE INTRODUCED IN RESPONSE TO CHANGES IN THE PAYMENT 
SYSTEM?
New regulations, new operators and new technologies will transform the payment system ahead. At the 
same time, cash usage is falling. Norges Bank is considering whether introducing a central bank digital 
currency may be desirable.
Access by the public to central bank money is a key feature of the payment system. This access is currently 
provided for by cash. But at some point, cash usage may become so low that despite its status as legal tender, 
cash may no longer be considered a generally available means of payment. To ensure a secure and efficient 
payment system and confidence in the monetary system also in the future, Norges Bank is analysing the 
 feasibility of introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC). In summer 2019, a Norges Bank working group 
published its second report on CBDCs1.
Deposit money is a secure means of payment, but a CBDC may be a good back-up solution and promote 
competition
In its second report, the working group concluded that introduction of a CBDC does not seem necessary to 
ensure the public access to a secure means of payment. The regulatory framework for the financial system 
already provides for this, and the deposit money created by banks is a secure means of payment. Within the 
deposit guarantee, there is no credit risk.
The working group believes that the contingency preparedness aspect may be an argument for introducing a 
CBDC. A CBDC can secure technical autonomy from ordinary payment systems and sufficient national control. 
A CBDC can also offer competition with private payment solutions in a situation where competition proves 
weak. Finally, a CBDC can be useful for ensuring access to legal tender in the Norwegian financial system. The 
payment system and means of payment may evolve in a different direction or at a different pace than can be 
currently foreseen. A precautionary approach may warrant practical preparations in order to keep open the 
possibility of introducing a CBDC.
A possible design of a CBDC is now being studied
On the condition that deposit money will continue to be a substantial part of bank financing, also if a CBDC is 
introduced in Norway, the working group is considering two different models for a CBDC.
• One model is a “register-based” solution. Unlike deposit money, control over register-based “tokens” is not 
based on an account linked to a personal identity. Funds may be used by the party in possession of an access 
code. This solution will also need to facilitate compliance with anti-money laundering rules.
• An alternative is a “closed account” solution. In it, both payer and payee must have a CBDC account. The 
CBDC may then be regarded as e-money issued by a public entity (and not by an e-money institution like 
PayPal).
The working group is considering both models with respect to fitness for purpose and to possible undesired 
consequences for financial stability.
The ongoing study of the design of a CBDC is part of a long-term effort, and Norges Bank will monitor inter-
national thinking in this area. More information is needed before a conclusion can be drawn that introducing a 
CBDC is a desirable measure for promoting a secure and efficient payment system and continued confidence 
in the monetary system. Norges Bank will continue to issue cash as long as it is appropriate.
1 See Norges Bank (2019) “Central bank digital currencies” Norges Bank Papers 2/2019.
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Banks play a key role in the economy and perform 
important tasks such as channelling funds, executing 
payments and distributing risk efficiently. Banks’ 
ability to absorb credit losses depends on underlying 
profitability and solvency. Robust liquidity is also 
important in order for banks to carry out their tasks 
well, even during periods of funding market stress.
2.1 PROFITABILITY
Continued solid profitability among Norwegian 
banks
The large Norwegian banks have maintained their 
profitability over the past year and are, together with 
Swedish banks, at a high level compared with other 
European banks (Chart 2.1).
Stable net interest income and low credit losses have 
enabled Norwegian banks to maintain profitability 
(Chart 2.2). Banks’ primary revenue source is net inter-
est income from traditional banking. The increase in 
net interest income improved the profitability of the 
largest Norwegian banks in 2017, 2018 and in the first 
half of 2019 (Chart 2.3). Lending rates have risen more 
than deposit rates, resulting in higher interest margins 
in recent quarters.
Profitability expected to be maintained
Mainland GdP is expected to slow somewhat in the 
coming years (see Monetary Policy Report 3/19). Bank 
analysts’ average projection of the largest banking 
groups’ profitability for the coming years is at broadly 
For Norwegian banks, credit losses are low and profitability is solid. Sustained profitability is 
expected in the coming years. Downside risks are higher losses and reduced margins owing to 
increased competition between banks and from new entrants.
Banks are solid and fulfil the capital requirements. The remaining parts of the EU capital frame-
work will likely be implemented soon in Norway. Norwegian and European rules will then become 
more harmonised.
Norwegian banks have ample access to funding. They satisfy liquidity requirements and their 
vulnerability to a dry-up of short-term foreign currency funding is reduced. Finanstilsynet (Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway) aims to set resolution plans and requirements for own funds 
and eligible liabilities for the nine most important Norwegian banks by year-end 2019. In Norway, 
future regulations may permit securitisation, which is a new funding source for lending.
2 Bank profitability, solvency  
and funding
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Chart 2.1 Return on equity after tax. Large Norwegian banking groups1) 
and European2) banks. Four-quarter moving weighted average. Percent. 
2016 Q1 – 2019 Q2
1) Weighted average of DNB Bank, Nordea Bank Norge (to 2016 Q4), SpareBank 1 SR-
Bank, Sparebanken Vest, SpareBank 1 SMN, Sparebanken Sør (from 2016 Q1), 
SpareBank 1 Østlandet (from 2016 Q3) and SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge. Consolidated 
figures. 2) Based on a sample of 150 European banks. The sample varies over time.
Sources: European Banking Authority (EBA), Norwegian banking groups' quarterly and 
annual reports and Norges Bank 
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Chart 2.2 Decomposed change in profits. Large Norwegian banking 
groups.1) As a percentage of average total assets. 2009 Q1 – 2019 Q2
1) Weighted average of DNB Bank, Nordea Bank Norge (to 2016 Q4), 
SpareBank 1 SR-Bank, Sparebanken Vest, SpareBank 1 SMN, Sparebanken Sør (from 
2014 Q1), SpareBank 1 Østlandet (from 2016 Q3) and SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge. 
2) Commission income from part–owned mortgage companies in the SpareBank 1–
alliance has been reclassified from other operating income to net interest income.
Sources: Bank's quarterly reports and Norges Bank
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Chart 2.3 Estimated contributions to changes in large Norwegian banking
groups'1) return on equity after tax. Four-quarter moving weighted average 
of annualised return. Percentage points. 2016 Q1 – 2019 Q2
1) Weighted average of DNB Bank, Nordea Bank Norge (to 2016 Q4), Sparebank 1 SR-
Bank, Sparebanken Vest, Sparbanken Vest, SpareBank 1 SMN, Sparebanken Sør (from 
2014 Q1), SpareBank 1 Østlandet (from 2016 Q3) and SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge. 
2) Commission income from part–owned mortgage companies in the SpareBank 1–
alliance has been reclassified from other operating income to net interest income.
Sources: Banks' quarterly reports and Norges Bank
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Chart 2.4 Analysts' estimates of return on equity in large Norwegian 
banking groups.1) Percent. At 31 October 2019
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Chart 2.5 Large Nordic banking groups' interest expenses, interest income 
and net interest income. As a percentage of total assets. 2016 – 2018
1) 3-month Nibor, Stibor, Cibor and Euribor.
Sources: SNL / S&P MI, Refinitiv and Danske Bank's annual report
the same level as in recent years (Chart 2.4). Norges 
Bank’s bankruptcy probability model1 indicates that 
banks’ credit risk on loans to non-financial enterprises 
will be fairly stable in 2019 and increase slightly in 
2020. With prospects for continued low credit losses 
and the absence of major economic shocks, banks 
as a whole are therefore expected to maintain solid 
profitability in the coming years.
European banks’ profitability under pressure 
from negative interest rates
The profitability of large danish banks has weakened 
in recent quarters (Chart 2.1), owing in part to the low 
interest rate level. Swedish, danish and euro area 
money market rates have been negative since 2015. 
Banks are reluctant to offer negative deposit rates as 
depositors have the option of withdrawing their 
deposits in cash rather than pay a negative deposit 
rate. In spite of negative money market rates, average 
Swedish and danish deposit rates are not negative.
Since banks’ wholesale funding includes a risk 
premium on top of the money market rate, the inter-
est rate on wholesale funding can be positive even 
when the money market rate is negative. With deposit 
rates close to zero, wholesale funding costs will 
account for most of banks’ total interest expenses. 
This was the case for Handelsbanken, Swedbank, 
danske Bank and Nordea in the period 2016–2018 
(Chart 2.5). deposit rates in Norway are positive, and 
for dNB deposit costs account for a large share of 
interest expenses. With a deposit rate close to zero, 
a further reduction in the interest rate level will likely 
merely reduce the cost of wholesale funding.
Reduced operating costs or increased revenue may 
compensate for the cost disadvantage of a limited 
pass-through to deposit rates when the money 
market rate is negative. Revenue can primarily be 
increased through higher lending growth, higher fees 
and higher lending margins. Banks in Sweden have 
kept their lending rates elevated, which has con-
tributed to sustaining the level of net interest income 
(Chart 2.6). In denmark, the low level of interest rates 
and falling interest margins have resulted in lower net 
1 The model is described in Hjelseth, I.N. and A. Raknerud (2016), “A model 
of credit risk in the corporate sector based on bankruptcy prediction”, 
Staff Memo 20/2016, Norges Bank. The model primarily covers industries 
in mainland Norway.
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interest income.2 Fee income has been relatively 
stable in Norway, Sweden and denmark.
If interest rates remain very low or negative over a 
long period, structural changes may result in the 
financial system, which could also impact banks.3 
Over time, depositors may opt for higher-risk invest-
ments, such as mutual funds, rather than keep their 
money in a bank at zero interest. Low interest rates 
over an extended period may also fuel a credit-driven 
2 See danmarks Nationalbank (2019) Financial Stability – 1st half 2019, page 7.
3 The consequences of very low and negative interest rates are also 
 discussed in Section 6 of Financial Stability Report 2016 and in European 
Systemic Risk Board (2016) “Macroprudential policy issues arising from 
low interest rates and structural changes in the EU financial system”.
rise in prices for assets such as equities and real 
estate. Low interest rates also make it difficult for 
pension and insurance companies to meet the rate-
of-return guarantees for their pension products.
Risk of increased losses
Some uncertainty still remains about the need for 
further restructuring in oil-related enterprises. Such 
restructuring has inflicted losses on banks in recent 
years. The losses proved to be somewhat lower than 
initially expected following the fall in oil prices in 2014, 
and spillovers to other sectors have been more 
modest than assumed. Persistent overcapacity in 
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Chart 2.7 Debt-servicing capacity1) in the oil service industry. Percent. 
2014 Q1 – 2019 Q2
1) Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) for the last 
four quarters as a percentage of net interest-bearing debt. The EBITDA measure has 
been standardised by Bloomberg. Manual adjustments for EBITDA have been made 
where erroneous registrations appear in Bloomberg's measure. 
Sources: Bloomberg, company quarterly and annual reports and Norges Bank  
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Chart 2.6 Operating income for selected banking groups in 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark.1) As a percentage of total assets. 
2010 Q2 – 2019 Q2
1) Norwegian banks: DNB, SpareBank 1 SR-Bank, SpareBank 1 SMN, SpareBank 1 
Nord-Norge and Sparebanken Vest. Swedish banks: Handelsbanken, SEB and 
Swedbank. Danish banks: Danske Bank, Jyske Bank, Spar Nord Bank and Sydbank.
Source: SNL / S&P MI and Norges Bank
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Chart 2.7 Debt-servicing capacity1) in the oil service industry. Percent. 
2014 Q1 – 2019 Q2
1) Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) for the last 
four quarters as a percentage of net interest-bearing debt. The EBITDA measure has 
been standardised by Bloomberg. Manual adjustments for EBITDA have been made 
where erroneous registrations appear in Bloomberg's measure. 
Sources: Bloomberg, company quarterly and annual reports and Norges Bank  
segments of the oil service industry may lead to 
further restructuring accompanied by losses, since 
the debt-servicing capacity of many oil service com-
panies has weakened in recent years (Chart 2.7). 
Banks’ direct oil-related exposures are nevertheless 
limited and account for less than 5% of total expo-
sures (see box on page 49).
A substantial share of banks’ exposures is to com-
mercial real estate (CRE) (Chart 3.8). Commercial 
property prices are at a high level (Chart 1.11). The rise 
in prices has often been strong prior to a substantial 
fall. Even though losses have historically been low in 
normal times, CRE is the sector where banks have 
historically incurred the larges losses during crises. 
The stress test in Section 3 shows banks’ vulnera bility 
to CRE losses in the event of a pronounced downturn 
in the Norwegian economy.
Prospects for increased competition
Technological and regulatory developments are allow-
ing the competitive landscape to change with the 
entry of new service providers in areas that are impor-
tant for banks’ profitability.
Crowdfunding, or extending credit through digital 
platforms, is an example of how new participants 
can impact competition in the credit market. The 
extent of crowdfunding so far has been very limited 
and had no impact on banks’ profitability in Norway. 
In spring 2019, Norges Bank conducted a survey of 
all active participants engaged in debt- and equity- 
based crowdfunding in Norway.4 debt-based crowd-
funding accounts for the largest share of financial 
crowdfunding.5 Total lending in the period between 
2018 Q1 and 2019 Q1 amounted to approximately 
NOK 110m (Chart 2.8). Lending to real estate projects 
and enterprises account for the largest share of 
lending. The share of consumer credit was approxi-
mately 5% and is growing.
The revised Payment Services directive (PSd2) 
entered into force in Norway on 1 April 2019.6 PSd2 
may provide customers with improved and less 
4 See Bankplassen blog, Fahre, B. and y. Søvik “Folkefinansiering vokser 
i Norge – hvordan kan norske myndigheter være forberedt?” 
 [Crowdfunding is growing in Norway – How can the Norwegian 
 authorities be prepared?] (in Norwegian only).
5 In the equity-based crowdfunding segment, the data are too limited to 
show any clear trends in recent years.
6 See the 2019 Financial Infrastructure Report for a further description of 
PSd2.
expensive banking services. The directive permits 
third-party providers (TPPs) to offer account informa-
tion services (AIS) and execute payments on behalf 
of banks’ customers. The TPPs are either new 
entrants or banks that already operate in the market. 
This may promote new services that facilitate com-
parison shopping for banking services. For example, 
a number of banks have upgraded their online banking 
platforms to enable customers to view multi-bank 
account details under a single portal.
By improving market transparency, PSd2 may 
promote competition in banking services and put 
pressure on banks’ interest margins and fee income. 
The effects of PSd2 on banks’ income will depend on 
how they adapt. Banks may strengthen customer 
loyalty by changing their services so that they are less 
vulnerable to increased competition. An example of 
this is customer dividends, which savings banks, for 
example, distribute to customers on the basis of 
amounts borrowed or on deposit over the preceding 
year. Banks may also offer customers benefits for 
purchasing services with lock-in periods or for pur-
chasing bundled products.
If profitability in the Norwegian banking market con-
tinues to be higher than what foreign banks are able 
to attain in their domestic markets, foreign banks may 
want to increase their activity in the Norwegian 
market. Increased competition from foreign banks 
may put pressure on interest margins and reduce 
profitability in the Norwegian banking market. Foreign- 
owned banks and foreign branches already have a 
substantial share of both the retail and corporate 
lending markets (Chart 2.9).
2.2 SOLVENCY
Banks have increased their Common Equity Tier 1 
(CET1) ratios since the financial crisis in 2008 (Chart 
2.10), primarily by retaining earnings. In 2018, banks’ 
capital ratios were broadly unchanged, even though 
their profitability was solid. The dividend payout ratios 
for most of the large banks were, with few exceptions, 
unchanged in 2018 compared with 2017. Increased 
lending, including corporate lending, resulted in an 
increase in risk-weighted assets and kept capital ratios 
unchanged. Nevertheless, all Norwegian banks fulfil 
the capital requirements. The large banks’ CET1 
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Chart 2.9 Market shares measured by gross lending. 
Large banking groups in Norway. Percent. At 31 December 2018
1) Nordea, Danske Bank and Handelsbanken.
Source: Norges Bank 
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capital ratios are near their long-term capital targets 
(Chart 2.11). The stress test shows that Norwegian 
banks have sufficient capital to absorb losses in the 
event of a hypothetical pronounced downturn in the 
Norwegian economy (See Section 3 Stress test).
Norges Bank supports the Ministry of Finance’s 
proposed changes to capital requirements
The remaining portions of the EU capital framework 
(CRR/CRd Iv) will likely be implemented in Norway 
soon. Norwegian and EU rules will then become more 
harmonised. As a part of this, the capital requirement 
for exposures to small and medium-sized enterprises 
will be reduced (SME discount). The SMB discount 
will provide the greatest capital relief to banks using 
the standardised approach, with high shares of SME 
exposures. In addition, rules will be relaxed for banks 
using internal ratings-based models (IRB banks), 
which will not be required to use the Basel I floor for 
risk-weighted assets when calculating their capital 
ratios. Both of these changes will allow banks to 
report higher capital ratios without changing sol-
vency levels. For the largest IRB banks, the removal 
of the Basel I floor will have the most pronounced 
impact (Chart 2.12).
In June, the Ministry of Finance circulated for 
comment proposed adjustments to the capital 
requirements for banks, with a consultation closing 
date of 30 September. The proposed adjustments 
are intended to keep the capital requirements at a 
level that corresponds to risks in the Norwegian 
economy. The proposal also entails an increase in 
the systemic risk buffer from 3.0% to 4.5%.  The 
 Ministry has also proposed a temporary 35% floor 
for average risk weights for Norwegian commercial 
real estate (CRE) exposures, reflecting the wide 
 variation in the risk weights for CRE exposures and 
thus the amount of capital underlying them (Chart 
2.13 and box on page 29).
The Ministry of Finance intends to ask the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to issue a recommenda-
tion to EU member state authorities to recognise the 
Norwegian requirements so that they will also apply 
to foreign banks with operations in Norway. This is 
desirable for financial stability reasons and for secur-
ing a level playing field for Norwegian and foreign 
banks. Norges Bank holds the view that it will be 
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Chart 2.12 Effects of introducing CRR/CRD IV on CET1 ratios. Largest 
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1) Banks' estimates.
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natural to apply the current systemic risk buffer rate 
in the host country.
Norges Bank supports the proposed increase of the 
systemic risk buffer.7 The Bank also supports the 
 principle that the systemic risk buffer should be 
reviewed every other year and in this regard, will 
perform necessary assessments of systemic risk. 
Banks have substantial exposures to the real estate 
sector, through both residential mortgages and CRE 
loans. These exposures have increased since the 
 systemic risk buffer requirement was introduced in 
2013. Moreover, banks are closely interconnected, for 
example, through cross-holding of covered bonds.
7 See Norges Banks høringssvar om tilpasninger i kapitalkravene for banker 
30. september 2019. [Norges Bank’s consultation response of 30 Septem-
ber 2019 on adjustments to capital requirements for banks] (in Norwegian 
only).
MATERIAL DIFFERENCES IN RISK WEIGHTS FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 
EXPOSURES
The risk weights that banks use for their commercial real estate (CRE) exposures range from 100% for stand-
ardised approach banks to a 23% average risk weight for large Swedish banks1. Norwegian IRB banks fall in 
between. Risk weights affect the amount of capital banks must hold. The share of CRE loans that a bank must 
finance using Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital is estimated by multiplying the bank’s CET1 capital require-
ment with its average risk weight for CRE exposures and then put on an add-on for operational risk. The calcu-
lated share varies between 4% for large Swedish banks and 17% for the Norwegian standardised approach 
banks (Chart 2.13).2
The considerable variation in risk weights for CRE exposures may have a number of explanations. One might 
be different portfolio compositions across banks. The market for lending to CRE companies is heterogeneous, 
and credit risk on these exposures can vary considerably. Some banks’ borrowers have lower credit risk, and 
therefore their CRE exposures have lower risk weights than those of other banks. Another possible explanation 
for the variation is that banks employ different methods and risk models. This may result in different risk weights 
for comparable exposures.
The authorities in a number of European countries have introduced minimum risk weight requirements.  According 
to a preliminary assessment by the Swedish supervisory authority, the average risk weight for CRE exposures 
should be increased to a minimum of 30%. The Ministry of Finance’s proposed 35% minimum risk weight 
requirement for Norwegian CRE exposures is at or below the average risk weight of Norwegian IRB banks.
1 See Finansinspektionen (2019), “Stability in the Financial System (2019:1)”.
2 For a further description of the calculations, see Andersen, H. (2019) “How much capital must banks set aside for CRE exposures?” (forthcoming in 
English). Staff Memo [10/2019]. Norges Bank. In this Memo, capital requirements are assessed against CRE losses during the banking crisis.
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Chart 2.13 Banks' average risk weights for commercial real estate (CRE) 
exposures. Required share of CRE exposures financed by CET1.1) 
Percent. At 31 December 2018
1) The total CET1 requirement is the sum of Pillar 1 requirements, hard Pillar 2 
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for Norwegian banks. The hard Pillar 2 requirement for standardised-approach banks is 
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2.3 FUNDING
Favourable funding conditions in capital 
markets
Along with customer deposits, bonds and short-term 
paper account for the most important funding 
sources for Norwegian banks. Norwegian banks and 
mortgage companies have ample access to wholesale 
funding in both NOK and foreign currency. Higher 
funding costs for Nordic banks under investigation 
for violating anti-money laundering rules have not 
spread to Norwegian banks. Greater focus on climate 
risk can have an impact on Norwegian banks’ funding 
costs owing to the oil industry’s importance for the 
Norwegian economy (see Section 4 Climate Risk).
Low yields on safe government securities have made 
investments with higher risk and higher expected 
returns more attractive to investors. This has reduced 
risk premiums on banks’ wholesale funding and created 
favourable funding conditions, also for  Norwegian 
banks (Chart 2.14). Since Financial Stability Report 
2018, uncertainty regarding future interest rate levels 
has increased, and long-term interest rates have fallen 
further globally (Chart 1.2). This may pull down banks’ 
funding costs further. At the same time, uncertainty 
related to trade tensions and Brexit may increase risk 
premiums in the short term and worsen banks’ access 
to wholesale funding.
New requirements for reference rates
Reference rates play a pivotal role in the financial 
system. They simplify financial contracts by eliminating 
the need for agreement on the rate that will serve as 
the basis for each individual contract entered into.8 The 
value of loans and various financial products linked to 
reference rates is very high. The reference rate NIBOR 
must be adapted to new EU requirements (the Bench-
marks Regulation) that will apply in Norway through 
the EEA Agreement. The rules are intended to ensure 
confidence in the reference rates among market 
 participants and other parties (see box on page 33).
Norwegian banks dependent on covered bonds
Two-thirds of banks’ funding in the bond market com-
prises covered bonds (Chart 2.15). Norwegian banks 
and mortgage companies are the largest investors in 
8 See Lund, K. (2018) “Hva er referanserenter og hvorfor er de så viktige?” 
[What are reference rates and why are they so important?]  
(in Norwegian only). Published on Bankplassen blog 25 September 2018.
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Chart 2.16 Stock of liquid assets in NOK by asset type. Norwegian banks.1) 
After haircut and before caps. Percent. At 30 June 2019
1) Consolidated figures where available. Parent banks otherwise.
Source: Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway)
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the covered bond market, holding over 50% of the total. 
Most of the bonds are held as liquidity reserves. At the 
end of June 2019, covered bonds accounted for over 
half of banks’ liquidity reserves in NOK (Chart 2.16).9
Norwegian banks’ substantial covered bond holdings 
amplify the interconnectedness of Norwegian finan-
cial institutions and may constitute a systemic risk. 
This may intensify liquidity problems for Norwegian 
banks in situations where funding dries up and many 
banks are forced to liquidate large covered bond hold-
ings at the same time. The value of the banks’ liquid-
ity portfolio could then rapidly decline. A concurrent 
fall in house prices may worsen liquidity problems 
and force further sales of liquidity reserves.10 It is 
therefore important that banks’ liquid assets under 
the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requirement can 
be traded without causing appreciable price changes.
Predicting the behaviour of market participants in a 
crisis is difficult due to limited experience as to how 
easily covered bonds can be traded and issued or to 
what extent their value will hold up against a fall in 
house prices. In periods of market turbulence, the 
liquidity of covered bonds has deteriorated less than 
that of unsecured bank bonds. An analysis of conta-
gion effects in the banking sector illustrates how 
connectedness will affect banks’ capital ratios (see 
box on page 45).
Lower vulnerability to short-term foreign 
currency funding dry-up
Many international banks, including dNB, fund lending 
with short-term deposits and short-term paper in 
foreign money markets. Such short-term wholesale 
foreign currency funding accounts for about 12% of 
bank funding.
Short-term funding must be rolled over frequently, 
and it has been shown that such funding may dry up 
in turbulent times. Historically, professional investors 
such as money market funds, large companies and 
other banks have been quick to withdraw deposits 
from banks in which they have lost confidence. 
Mandate changes among institutional investors may 
also result in unexpected shifts in banks’ access to 
short-term funding.
9 The rules allow covered bonds to constitute up to 70% of banks’ liquidity 
portfolio.
10 See page 36 of Financial Stability Report 2015.
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Chart 2.17 Short-term funding and central bank deposits in foreign 
currency.1) Norwegian banks. Share of total assets. Percent. 2009 – 20192)
1) Comprises deposits from foreign customers and central banks, and debt securities 
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Short-term foreign currency funding is largely invested 
in liquid and secure assets such as central bank 
deposits and other highly liquid securities. The share 
of short-term foreign currency funding that is not 
placed in central banks has declined in recent years 
and is now approximately 3% of total assets (Chart 2.17). 
The maturity of banks’ short-term foreign  currency 
funding has also lengthened somewhat, possibly 
indicating that Norwegian banks have become less 
vulnerable to a dry-up of short-term foreign currency 
funding.
Norwegian banks satisfy the LCR requirements.11 The 
total LCR and the LCR in NOK have been high and 
stable over the past few years (Chart 2.18). However, 
banks may be vulnerable if they lose access to funding 
over the LCR’s 30-day horizon. A Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR) requirement may reduce these vulner-
abilities. The NSFR is now finalised and adopted by 
the EU, but has not yet been transposed into Norwe-
gian law. Nevertheless, Norwegian banks have 
reported their NSFRs for several years and satisfy the 
minimum requirement (Chart 2.19).
New requirement for banks’ own funds and 
eligible liabilities
On 1 January 2019, a new regulatory framework for 
bank recovery and resolution in Norway entered into 
force.12 The underlying principle is that if a bank is in 
trouble, the bank’s shareholders and then creditors 
must bear the losses and contribute towards the 
bank’s recapitalisation and taxpayer funds should not 
be used. For the efficient resolution of a bank that 
loses all or part of its equity, it must have own funds 
and eligible liabilities that can quickly be written down 
and/or converted to new equity (bail-in). Finans-
tilsynet aims to set resolution plans for the nine most 
important Norwegian banks by end-2019.13 In the res-
olution plans for these banks, minimum requirements 
for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) will be 
set.14 The requirements will be published.
11 For more details on LCR see box on page 32 in Financial Stability Report 
2018. 
12 See page 19 in Financial Stability Report 2017.
13 The nine banks are listed on Finanstilsynet’s webpage on Minimum 
 Requirements for the sum of own funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL).
14 See Chapter 20 Part II of Regulation of 9 december 2016 No 1502 on 
 financial institutions and financial groups (Financial Institutions 
 Regulation) (in Norwegian only).
For Finanstilsynet, an important principle is that MREL 
is met with either regulatory capital or with liabilities 
that rank below ordinary unsecured senior bonds, 
called subordinated liabilities. When MREL liabilities 
are subordinated, national resolution authorities can 
more easily treat creditors with the same priority 
equally when bail-in tools are applied at a failed bank.
Securitisation: a new funding source for 
lending
The EU has established a common securitisation 
framework, which entered into force 1 January 2019. 
One of its aims is to remedy the weaknesses that 
were revealed during the global financial crisis. Large 
losses were incurred on US securitised bonds, largely 
owing to the bonds issued for immediate resale, 
under the originate-to-distribute model. This model 
was little used in Europe, and losses associated with 
European securitisation were relatively moderate.
Securitisation is in practice currently not feasible in 
Norway. The Ministry of Finance has recently circu-
lated for comment a proposal to implement the EU’s 
Securitisation Regulation in Norwegian law.15 The 
regulation includes general rules on securitisation and 
sets the criteria for a new class of simple, transparent 
and standardised (STS) securitisations.
Securitisation takes place when banks sell their loans 
to special purpose vehicles (SPvs), which fund the 
purchase of these loans by issuing securities in the 
market. Securitisation creates new opportunities for 
funding and risk management for banks, borrowers 
and investors.
The extent of securitisation remains fairly modest in 
the European countries where this form of financing 
has been used for some time. If securitisation were 
to reach the same extent in Norway as the average 
of these countries, it would amount to just over NOK 
300bn or approximately 7% of banks’ and mortgage 
companies’ total lending.
15 See Norges Banks høringssvar om gjennomføring av EUs verdi-
papiriseringsforordning 23. september 2019 [Norges Bank’s consultation 
response of 23 September 2019 on the implementation of the EU’s  
Securitisation Regulation] (in Norwegian only).
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TOWARDS MORE ROBUST NORWEGIAN REFERENCE RATES
Reference rates play a pivotal role in the financial system. The value of financial products and loan con-
tracts linked to these rates is very high. Rules for the reference rate Nibor must be adapted to the EU’s 
Benchmarks Regulation (BMR) when it is transposed into Norwegian law. Amendments to the Nibor rules 
were circulated for comment. The BMR also requires financial contracts to reference an alternative bench-
mark. A working group has recommended Nowa as an alternative reference rate for the Norwegian krone 
Norges Bank supports the group’s proposal.
Nibor will be adjusted to new requirements
Activity in unsecured interbank markets at longer maturities has fallen both globally and in Norway in the years 
since the financial crisis. Ibor rates1, traditionally the most important reference rates, have been based on 
transactions in this market. Owing to fewer transactions, ibor rates in recent years have increasingly been 
judgement-based. There was also evidence that the Libor rate, for example, had been deliberately manipulated. 
Both developments have undermined confidence in these rates.
In 2014, the Financial Stability Board recommended reforming current reference rates and identifying alterna-
tives. The EU has established a separate regulation on financial benchmarks, the Benchmarks Regulation (BMR)2, 
which will also apply to Nibor when the regulation is transposed into Norwegian law. In the light of new  regulatory 
requirements, the calculation methodology for a number of ibor rates has been changed. Nibor’s administrator, 
Norske Finansielle Referanser AS (NoRe), launched a public consultation on a proposed new methodology for 
Nibor in August.3 The proposed methodology is largely the same as in the current Nibor rules, but contains 
new and more specific provisions on the input data panel banks should use when determining their Nibor 
submissions. A “waterfall” structure specifies an order of priority for banks’ input data. Norges Bank is  generally 
in favour of the proposed methodology, but holds the view that the proposal does not meet all the BMR require-
ments related to documentation and responsibility.4 To ensure accountability and transparency, Norges Bank 
proposes that panel banks should provide more documentation of the methodology used in the determination 
of their submissions. This would be in line with changes to other ibor rates and would strengthen confidence 
in Nibor as a reference rate.
Nowa recommended as alternative reference rate for the Norwegian krone
The BMR also requires users of reference rates to nominate one or several alternative benchmarks that could 
be referenced in a contract. The rate shall be used as a benchmark if the contract’s original benchmark is 
 substantially changed or no longer available. In parallel with efforts abroad, Norges Bank took the initiative in 
2018 to establish a working group with a mandate to identify an alternative reference rate for the Norwegian 
krone. The working group comprises participants from Norwegian banks and branches of foreign banks. After 
considering a number of alternatives, in September 2019, the working group published its recommendation 
that Nowa (Norwegian Overnight Weighted Average) should be the alternative Norwegian krone reference 
rate. Norges Bank supports the recommendation of Nowa as an alternative reference rate.
Nowa is currently the only overnight rate in the Norwegian money market. The rate was established in 2011 at 
the request of Norges Bank. Norges Bank will take over as the administrator for Nowa on 1 January 2020 and 
has published proposed rules for the calculation and publication of the rate.5 The rate will be published based 
on the new calculation as from 1 January 2020. Work remains to be done before Nowa can be introduced as an 
alternative reference rate.
In spite of the past year’s work on reference rates, there is uncertainty as to the continued existence of ibor rates. 
It is primarily up to users and market participants to adjust to new requirements and rules and choose which  reference 
rates to use in financial contracts. More robust and transparent reference rates, and the existence of a generally 
accepted alternative, have the potential to reduce risk for market participants and promote financial stability.
1 Ibor = Interbank offered rate.
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016.
3 See Norske Finansielle Referanser (NoRe) (2019) “Nibor: New methodology – Public consultation”.
4 See Norges Bank’s Consultation response – changes to Nibor based on new EU/EEA requirements of 1 October 2019.
5 See Norges Bank (2019) “Consultation: Principles for calculating and publishing Nowa”. 15 October 2019.
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3.1 STRESS SCENARIO
The purpose of the stress test is to analyse the macro-
economic effects of banks’ behaviour in the event of 
a pronounced downturn in the Norwegian economy. 
To enable banks to meet credit demand and conduct 
other business, banks must have sufficient capital 
when a crisis erupts. The analyses are framed to 
assess how banks are affected by, and how they 
themselves affect economic developments.1
Financial imbalances amplify the downturn
As a number of empirical calculations show that crises 
are more serious when preceded by a build-up of 
financial imbalances, Norges Bank seeks to cross-
check the depth of the crisis against the Bank’s 
assessment of financial imbalances. A broad range 
of indicators and methodologies is applied to shed 
light on how severe the downturn can be (see box on 
page 41).
The stress scenario is based on a pronounced, but 
conceivable, downturn in the Norwegian economy 
(see Table 3.1). The methods used indicate a 5% prob-
ability that mainland GdP will fall as much or more 
than assumed in the stress scenario. In line with the 
balance of risks for the Norwegian economy, the 
downturn is about as severe as in Financial Stability 
Report 2018.
1 A detailed description of the stress test framework is presented in 
 Andersen, H., K. Gerdrup, R. M. Johansen and T. Krogh (2019) “A macro-
prudential stress testing framework”. Staff Memo 1/2019. Norges Bank.
3 Stress test – banks’ response to 
a pronounced downturn
The stress test analyses the impact on banks’ credit losses, capital ratios and behaviour in the 
event of a pronounced economic downturn. Banks have built up a substantial capital buffer 
since 2013, and the countercyclical buffer rate at the start of the stress scenario has increased 
since Financial Stability Report 2018, strengthening their resilience to a pronounced economic 
downturn.
The stress test shows that, on the whole, banks’ capital buffers are sufficient to absorb losses 
that may arise in a downturn, but banks may nevertheless tighten lending considerably. This may 
amplify an economic downturn. Owing to differences in exposure to various sectors, the impact 
of a downturn may be more pronounced for some banks than for others. An analysis of inter-
connectedness between banks shows that fire sales of securities may lead to further falls in 
banks’ capital. The stress test shows that banks can maintain credit supply by drawing on buffers.
Table 3.1 Macroeconomic aggregates in the stress scenario. 
Percentage change from previous year1
20192,3 2020 2021 2022 2023
Mainland GdP 2.7 -1.9 -1.0 1.8 1.3
Private consumption 1.8 -1.2 -0.2 1.8 2.1
Registered unemploy-
ment (rate, level)
2.3 4.7 6.1 5.5 5.4
3-month Nibor (level) 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.0
Weighted risk premium 
for covered bonds and 
senior bank bonds4 (level)
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
House prices 2.5 -13.7 -12.9 -3.7 4.5
Commercial property 
prices
5.7 -22.8 -21.5 -6.1 7.5
Credit (C2), households5 5.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 1.8
Credit (C2), non-financial 
enterprises in mainland 
Norway5
7.3 -5.0 -0.5 -0.9 2.3
Credit losses6 (rate, level) 0.1 1.9 2.3 1.4 1.4
Countercyclical capital 
buffer requirement (level)
2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 Unless otherwise stated. Levels are measured as annual averages.
2 Projections for 2019 Q3 to 2019 Q4 for mainland GdP, private 
 consumption, unemployment, 3-month Nibor, house prices and credit  
to households are from Monetary Policy Report 3/2019.
3 Projections for 2019 Q3 to 2019 Q4 for commercial property prices are 
based market participants’ price forecasts.
4 The higher premiums only have an effect on new bonds.
5 Change in stock measured at year-end.
6 Impairment losses based on IFRS 9.
Sources: CBRE, Eiendomsverdi AS, Entra, Finn.no, NAv, Real Estate Norway, 
Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
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Norway is a small open economy and the international 
developments in the stress scenario contribute to a 
pronounced downturn in the Norwegian economy. 
despite setting the policy rate in Norway at zero, the 
money market rate remains elevated owing to 
increased risk premiums. Even though there is 
increased turbulence in financial markets, banks are 
assumed to have access to wholesale funding during 
the stress period, which may underestimate the 
effects on the Norwegian economy as historical epi-
sodes show that investors can choose to stop funding 
Norwegian banks in the event of uncertainty about 
bank solvency. Climate risk may also lead to bank 
losses, and uncertainty about climate exposure may 
result in funding problems (see Section 4 Climate risk). 
Any liquidity problems may amplify the financial crisis.
Financial market developments result in losses on 
banks’ securities portfolios. The value of banks’ stock 
of equities is written down by 40% and fixed-income 
instruments by 5% in 2020. The value of these instru-
ments is kept unchanged thereafter.
vulnerabilities associated with high household debt-
to-income ratios and elevated property prices amplify 
the downturn. In line with international experience 
during crises, an abrupt fall in property prices is 
assumed at the start of the stress scenario. Historical 
experience also suggests that commercial property 
prices are more volatile than house prices. It is therefore 
assumed that the price level will be reduced by almost 
half in the course of the stress period (Chart 3.1). In the 
The stress scenario is not a forecast of how the 
economy will develop in the event of a pronounced 
downturn, but what may happen when financial 
imbalances have built up. In a crisis, the authorities 
would typically implement a number of extraordinary 
measures to achieve economic policy objectives. 
during and following the 2008 financial crisis, for 
example, many countries loosened fiscal policy, and 
several central banks undertook large-scale asset 
purchases. The financial crisis showed that banks’ 
pre-crisis capital levels were inadequate. The stress 
test focuses on the dampening impact of time- 
varying capital requirements on a downturn. There-
fore no extraordinary fiscal or monetary policy meas-
ures are applied in the stress test. As a technical 
assumption, the policy rate is set at zero. In principle, 
a higher countercyclical capital buffer from the end 
of 2019 and a policy rate higher than in Financial 
 Stability Report 2018 provide somewhat more flexi-
bility in the use of tools.
In line with the global risk outlook described in Section 
1 Financial stability outlook, a marked reduction in 
global GdP and increased risk premiums are assumed 
in financial markets. This may be because of rapidly 
growing protectionism and trade tensions, which 
reduce global trade and fuel uncertainty. The limited 
monetary and fiscal space still evident in many coun-
tries may amplify the global downturn. In the stress 
scenario, oil prices fall by about 40% owing to lower 
global trade.
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Chart 3.1 House1) prices and commercial property prices2). Index. 2019 Q4 = 100.
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1) Seasonally adjusted and deflated by CPI-ATE. 2) Estimated selling prices per square metre for prime
office space in Oslo. Average selling price for the previous four quarters. Deflated by the GDP deflator for
mainland Norway. 3)
2019 are based on market participants' price forecasts. 
Sources: CBRE, Dagens Næringsliv, Eiendomsverdi, Entra, Finn.no, OPAK, Real Estate Norway,
Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 3.2 Loan losses as a share of gross loans to the sector. Historically (for all
banks and mortgage companies) and in the stress scenario (for the macro
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enterprises and households. 
Sources: SNL / S&P MI, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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light of reduced income expectations and falling 
 property prices, private consumption is sluggish and 
housing investment falls sharply. There is a marked 
reduction in investment willingness in the business 
sector.
Weaker economic growth leads to high credit 
losses
The combination of weak economic growth and ele-
vated interest expenses push up banks’ credit losses 
(Chart 3.2). On the back of lower demand from house-
holds, oil-related industries and Norway’s trading 
partners, combined with reduced collateral values, 
banks’ losses on loans to non-financial enterprises 
rise markedly.
The increase in credit losses is in line with the level 
observed during the Norwegian banking crisis. The 
sharp rise in credit losses in the event of a severe 
downturn is also in line with international experience 
(Chart 3.3). The relationship between activity levels 
and credit losses in the sample countries indicates 
that weaker economic developments are associated 
with higher credit losses. The correlation depends on 
the type of historical loss event covered. In the most 
common situations (around the median), credit losses 
rise substantially less than losses from tail events (the 
95-percentile).
In the stress scenario, the possible impact of new 
accounting rules for impairment recognition (IFRS 9) 
introduced in 2018 has also been taken into account. 
Under IFRS 9, recognition of credit impairment is 
based on more forward-looking assessments than 
under the previous accounting standard (IAS 39). The 
analyses in the box on page 43 indicate that just 
before and during a pronounced downturn credit 
losses are higher under IFRS 9 than under IAS 39. 
There is reason to believe that the impact of IFRS 9 
may be stronger the worse the economic outlook is 
at the start of a downturn. As the downturn in the 
stress test is substantially more severe than the 
downturns analysed in the box, the effects will be 
more pronounced. One possible effect of IFRS 9 is 
therefore illustrated by substantially bringing forward 
banks’ credit losses (Chart 3.4).
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Chart 3.5 The macro bank's change in Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital in the
stress scenario and contribution from different components. Percent. 20191)
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Chart 3.4 Loan losses as a share of gross loans in the stress scenario. Including
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1) Projections.                      
Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank
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Chart 3.3 Loan losses as a share of total loans (vertical scale) and GDP
measured relative to trend1) 2) 
1) International data cover 19 OECD countries. Measures of recognised impairment losses and the
sample of financial institutions vary across countries and time. GDP trend estimations use a two-sided
HP filter with lambda = 100. The lines show the estimated distribution of loan losses based on quantile
regressions with GDP as a deviation from trend and country-specific fixed effects. The lines include
fixed level effects for Norway. 2) The number of observations varies across countries. The data set
covers a total of 23 crises and is based on the dating of crises in Anundsen, A.K, K. Gerdrup, F.
Hansen and K. Kragh-Sørensen (2016) "Bubbles and Crises: The Role of House Prices and Credit".
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 31(7) November/December, pages 1291-1311. 
Sources: National central banks, OECD, SNL / S&P MI, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank 
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3.2 BANKS’ ADJUSTMENT TO CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS
The macro bank in the stress scenario is a weighted 
average of nine large Norwegian banks.2 In principle, 
the stress test focuses on developments in the macro 
bank and does not incorporate the effect of differ-
ences in the banks’ behaviour.
The average Pillar 1 Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) 
capital requirement for the banks in the stress test is 
13.8%.3 The macro bank must also satisfy the Pillar 2 
requirement set by Finanstilsynet (Financial Super-
visory Authority of Norway). The average Pillar 2 
requirement is 1.8%, bringing the total capital require-
ment for the macro bank to 15.6%. The macro bank 
also holds an additional buffer above the total capital 
requirement, and at the start of the stress period, the 
macro bank has a CET1 ratio of 16.0%.4
High losses impair banks’ profitability
Large losses on loans and securities lead to weak 
results for the macro bank throughout the stress 
period. As a result, the macro bank’s CET1 capital falls 
markedly (Chart 3.5). By the end of the stress period, 
CET1 capital is almost 14.7% lower than at the begin-
ning. At the same time, risk weights increase some-
what as a result of higher credit risk exposure. Both 
factors reduce the CET1 ratio (Chart 3.6).5
The fall in the capital ratio is reduced by the macro 
bank’s adjustment to meet the capital requirement. 
Cost-cutting measures through the stress period keep 
operating expenses broadly unchanged as a share of 
operating income. In addition, the macro bank does 
not pay dividends in the stress period. Banks’ capacity 
to maintain interest margins in the event of a down-
turn is uncertain, but during the banking crisis, 
margins were relatively stable. Margins against bor-
rowing costs are assumed to be held constant during 
the stress period. On the one hand, banks will want 
2 dNB Bank, SpareBank 1 SR-Bank, Sparebanken vest, SpareBank 1 SMN, 
Sparebanken Sør, SpareBank 1 Østlandet, SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge, 
Sbanken and Sparebanken Møre.
3 The stress test is based on the existing capital framework. The average 
Pillar 1 requirement takes into account that only one of the banks in the 
stress test faces a buffer requirement for systemically important banks. 
The technical assumption applied is the same countercyclical capital 
buffer rate for domestic and foreign exposures where the host country 
has set a rate that deviates from the Norwegian rate.
4 This figure is based on estimated retained earnings for 2019.
5 The macro bank does not breach the leverage ratio requirement or the 
announced MREL (Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible 
 Liabilities) requirements, assuming that the macro bank satisfies the 
MREL requirements.
to increase lending margins to compensate for higher 
risk and increase their earnings, but lower credit 
demand pulls in the direction of lower lending 
margins. These effects counteract each other in the 
stress scenario and provide the basis for unchanged 
margins.
The results of the stress test are sensitive to assump-
tions regarding lending margins. If margins against 
borrowing costs are assumed to be 0.5 percentage 
point lower in the stress period, banks’ earnings will 
weaken considerably, in isolation. This deterioration 
corresponds to a fall in the macro bank’s CET1 ratio 
of around 3 percentage points during the stress 
period.6
The macro bank also reduces the fall in the capital 
ratio by tightening the supply of new loans. It does 
this by requiring better collateral and by trying to 
increase lending margins. Lower credit demand, 
owing to the weakness in the housing market and 
lower business investment, also contribute to reduced 
lending growth.7 
More buffer capital restrains the tightening of 
bank lending
In the stress scenario, the countercyclical capital 
buffer rate is set at zero to mitigate the procyclical 
effects of tighter bank lending, reducing the macro 
bank’s total capital requirement to 13.1%.
Under the capital adequacy rules, the remaining 
buffer under Pillar 1 may also be drawn on in bad 
times. At the same time, drawing on the buffer entails 
restrictions on dividend, bonus and some other 
banking activities. Banks must give notification and 
then draw up a plan to restore compliance with the 
total capital requirement. If the consequences of 
breaching the total capital requirement are perceived 
as costly or uncertain, banks may be reluctant to draw 
on the buffers, even in the event of substantial losses. 
The same applies if banks’ lenders and investors 
require a high level of capital adequacy in order to 
continue to provide funding to banks.
6 See Section 3 of Financial Stability Report 2018 for more on the effect of 
changes in interest margins, 
7 The economic impact of tighter lending by the largest banks depends on 
whether the other banks, especially the branches of foreign banks, follow 
suit. This is not analysed in the stress test. Over the past 10 years, branches 
of foreign banks have experienced higher volatility in lending growth than 
Norwegian banks, see Turtveit, L.-T. (2017) “Branches of foreign banks 
and credit supply”. Economic Commentaries 3/2017. Norges Bank.
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Chart 3.8 The macro bank's lending by industry (inner circle), loss by
industry based on engagement data (middle circle), and losses by
industry with upwardly revised PD and LGD for commercial real estate
lending (outer circle). Percent of total corporate lending at 31 December
2018 
Sources: Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) and Norges Bank
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Setting the countercyclical capital buffer requirement 
at zero dampens the downturn. If the buffer were kept 
at 2.5%, banks would further tighten lending to meet 
the buffer requirement (Chart 3.6). The result would 
be weaker GdP growth and a more pronounced fall 
in credit supply (Chart 3.7).8 A higher countercyclical 
capital buffer rate compared with the level in Financial 
Stability Report 2018 provides somewhat greater flex-
ibility in the use of instruments and makes it some-
what easier for banks to maintain lending. The anal-
ysis shows the importance of banks having sufficient 
time-varying capital buffers before financial crises 
arise, which also reduces the risk of Norwegian banks’ 
debt-servicing capacity being called into doubt, result-
ing in funding problems.
Substantial differences between banks can 
amplify an economic downturn
The result from the macro stress test is nuanced if it 
is taken into account that the impact varies across 
banks. detailed information from Finanstilsynet about 
banks’ credit exposure by industry is used to allocate 
8 The economic impact of lower capital requirements is uncertain, but a 
number of international studies find significant positive effects of coun-
tercyclical capital buffers on lending and the real economy, see Jiménez, 
G., S. Ongena, J.-L. Peydró and J. Saurina (2017) “Macroprudential Policy, 
Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers, and Credit Supply: Evidence from 
the Spanish dynamic Provisioning Experiments”. Journal of Political 
Economy 125 (6), december pp 2126–2177 and Imbierowicz B., J. Kragh 
and J. Rangvid (2018) “Time-varying Capital Requirements and disclosure 
Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending decisions”. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 50 (4), May pp 573–602. Arbatli, E.C. and R. Juelsrud 
(2019) “Effects of reducing capital requirements: Evidence from Norway’s 
transition to Basel II” forthcoming Norges Bank Working Paper studies the 
impact of lower capital requirements owing to the phasing-in of Basel II in 
Norway and finds that banks with larger reductions in capital require-
ments increased their lending more.
the macro bank’s losses in the corporate sector to 
specific industries. The macro stress test is based on 
banks’ reported probability of default (Pd) and esti-
mates for the share of credit exposure that is 
expected to be lost in the event of default, loss given 
default (LGd) (see box on page 39). This allocation of 
credit losses represents just one of many possible 
scenarios. The purpose of the analysis is not to iden-
tify risk in individual banks, but to illustrate the impor-
tance of having sufficient capital buffers that can be 
drawn on when a crisis occurs.
Using this method, Pd and LGd levels at the end of 
2018 indicate that relative losses are largest in inter-
national shipping and for oil service enterprises, but 
the level of banks’ overall lending to these industries 
is not high. Commercial real estate (CRE) loans 
account for the largest share of banks’ corporate 
lending9, but banks report lower Pd and LGd figures 
for this type of exposure than for lending to many 
other sectors. Based on historical observations of 
losses in crises, CRE losses are generally low through 
normal business cycles, but high in severe financial 
crises.10 The stress test scenario assumes a pro-
nounced downturn. Pd and LGd values for CRE are 
9 Note that the share of CRE lending is lower than in a sector breakdown of 
loans in C2 as loans to foreign borrowers are also allocated to specific 
sectors. The Norwegian banking sector has a somewhat higher overall 
share of CRE lending than the stress test banks.
10 See Section 4 of Financial Stability Report 2018.
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Chart 3.7 Total change through the stress period in mainland GDP and credit
under different assumptions about developements in banks' capital
requirements.1) Percent 
1) Defined as the cumulative deviation from an estimated trend for GDP and the deviation from an
estimated trend at the end of the stress scenario for total credit. Trend GDP growth in constant prices is
set at 1.2 percent and trend credit growth is set at 3.7 percent. 
Source: Norges Bank 
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Chart 3.6 The macro bank's Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio and the CET1
ratio requirement under Pillar 1 and Pillar 21) under different assumptions about
2)
 
1) Pillar 2 requirements for the banks in the stress test are weighted by their risk-weighted assets. 2)
Sources: Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway), SNL / S&P MI and Norges Bank 
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adjusted upwards to illustrate the potential for sub-
stantial CRE losses in such a situation.11
Chart 3.8 shows the importance of the different 
assumptions. The inner circle shows loans by indus-
try. If loans to various industries are assumed to have 
the same risk characteristics, the distribution of credit 
losses will be the same as in the stress scenario. The 
middle circle shows loan loss distribution based on 
banks’ reported Pd and LGd figures. The loss rate on 
CRE loans then declines. The loss rate on loans to the 
international shipping industry and to oil service 
enterprises rises. The outer circle shows loss rates 
on CRE loans based on an upward adjustment of Pd 
and LGd. The loss rate on CRE loans then rises con-
siderably.
The exposures of the stress test banks vary consid-
erably (Chart 3.9). The same applies to the Pd and 
LGd values for the different exposures applied in the 
analysis. The impact on some banks will therefore 
be more pronounced than on others. All of the banks 
have substantial CRE exposures, but the share of 
CRE loans varies between 30% and 60% of their cor-
porate lending. For most of the banks, international 
shipping accounts for a small share of corporate 
lending, but at least one bank extends more than 
10% of its corporate loans to international shipping. 
11 Both Pd and LGd for CRE are adjusted upwards by 50%. This results in 
loss rates for CRE exposures that are broadly in line with what was obser-
ved during the Norwegian banking crisis (except for the losses in 1991, 
when CRE write-offs were particularly large).
Chart 3.8 The macro bank's lending by industry (inner circle), loss by
industry based on engagement data (middle circle), and losses by
industry with upwardly revised PD and LGD for commercial real estate
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Chart 3.9 Stress test banks' lending by industry. Percent of corporate
lending. At 31 December 2018
Sources: Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) and Norges Bank
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FINANSTILSYNET’S EXPOSURE 
DATABASE AND LOSS DISTRIBUTION 
ASSUMPTIONS
Each year, Finanstilsynet collects data on corpo-
rate exposures (enterprises and self-employed 
persons) from all Norwegian banks. Reporting 
includes both Norwegian and foreign borrowers. 
The database contains information on total loan 
balances and unused lines of credit for each indi-
vidual exposure, together with information on 
credit risk exposure, such as probability of default 
(PD), expected loss given default (LGD), the value 
of collateral and the average interest rate on the 
loans per individual exposure. The figures in this 
year’s stress test are from 2018. 
The illustration of the credit loss distribution in 
the stress test is based on banks’ disclosures of 
PD distribution. Exposures with a high PD are 
assumed to be the first to go into default. LGD is 
calculated based on banks’ assessments of LGD. 
Sectors where many exposures have a high PD 
therefore represent a relatively large share of total 
credit losses.
The analysis illustrates a possible distribution of 
the macro banks’ losses for the exposure distri-
bution measured at year-end 2018.
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Chart 3.7 Total change through the stress period in mainland GDP and credit
under different assumptions about developements in banks' capital
requirements.1) Percent 
1) Defined as the cumulative deviation from an estimated trend for GDP and the deviation from an
estimated trend at the end of the stress scenario for total credit. Trend GDP growth in constant prices is
set at 1.2 percent and trend credit growth is set at 3.7 percent. 
Source: Norges Bank 
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Chart 3.A Estimates of steepest fall in GDP based on different measures of
financial imbalances.1) Normalised levels of financial imbalance indicators
(horizontal scale). Steepest fall in GDP in annual percentage growth (vertical
1) Quantile regressions are applied to quantify the correlation between downside risk for mainland GDP
(fifth percentile) and various measures of financial imbalances (backdated two years). Measures of
financial imbalances are normalised based on their cumulative distribution. All estimates based on the
same indicator have the same colour. Different transformations are indicated by different shapes.
Estimates based on local projections show the pre-crisis correlation between credit indicators and GDP
developments in crises based on 20 OECD countries. 
Sources: CBRE, Dagens Næringsliv, Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, OPAK, Real Estate Norway, Statistics
Norway and Norges Bank 
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Lending to oil service enterprises also varies among 
the banks.
There is considerable uncertainty attached to indi-
vidual banks’ adjustments to higher losses and the 
possible consequences of such adjustments. Banks 
with substantial losses may tighten lending consid-
erably, and if they are large banks or several small 
banks, the economic downturn may be more pro-
nounced than when only the macro bank is analysed. 
The macroeconomic consequences will be more 
limited if the largest losses are isolated to banks that 
are less important for the Norwegian economy.
Banks can also make other adjustments that reduce 
the need to tighten lending. One possibility is to issue 
new equity capital, which may be both costly and 
difficult at a time of financial turbulence, combined 
with a weak economic outlook. Another possibility 
may be to sell assets, but at distressed prices, this 
can entail considerable losses and inflict further losses 
on other banks through contagion effects.
Interconnectedness across banks may lead to 
further losses
Banks are interconnected as they are exposed to one 
another and as they hold the same or similar securi-
ties. An analysis by Norges Bank shows that conta-
gion effects may lead to further losses in the Norwe-
gian banking sector (see box on page 45). This is 
primarily due to indirect contagion from fire sales of 
securities with subsequent price falls. In the Bank’s 
model, such contagion effects entail up to a 2 per-
centage point fall in the CET1 ratio, depending on the 
assumptions made.
One of the uncertainty factors in the analysis is what 
is needed to trigger a fire sale. In the model, banks 
have funding problems when CET1 ratios fall below 
a defined level, which may be, for example, because 
lenders doubt banks’ debt-servicing capacity. To 
improve liquidity, banks will attempt to sell off liquid 
assets. In some cases, price falls may be substantial, 
but even small falls are important when large holdings 
of securities are affected. If funding problems start 
even when there is a modest fall in capital ratios, 
more banks will have to conduct fire sales, resulting 
in higher losses.
The systemic risk buffer is a component of the total 
buffer requirement and is intended to cover structural 
vulnerabilities and the consequences of a closely 
interconnected financial system.12 The analysis shows 
that the interconnectedness of banks may amplify 
total losses and illustrates the importance of main-
taining an adequate systemic risk buffer rate require-
ment.
12 See Chapter 3 of Report to the Storting No. 1 (2017–2018). National Budget 
2018.
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THE STRESS SCENARIO REFLECTS FINANCIAL IMBALANCES
The depth of the crisis in the stress scenario reflects Norges Bank’s assessment of financial imbalances. The 
Bank employs a broad range of indicators and a number of methodologies to link the level of financial imbalances 
to crisis severity.
Empirical analyses show that the impact of financial crises is more severe when preceded by a rapid build-up 
of financial imbalances.1 The economic downturn in the stress test is therefore assumed to be more severe the 
greater the magnitude of the financial imbalances at the outset.
Crisis depth estimates are based on a broad range of indicators
Mainland GDP is used as an indicator of the severity of the stress scenario. Crisis depth is measured along two 
dimensions:
1. Lowest annual GDP growth over the four-year stress period
2. Total GDP shortfall during the first three years of the stress period measured as the deviation from pre-cri-
sis GDP
Two methods are used to link financial imbalances to the measures of crisis severity. Local projections2 use 
international data and estimate a relationship between GDP developments in financial crises and the pre-crisis 
levels of financial imbalances3 An alternative method is “Growth-at-Risk” (GaR), which uses quantile regressions 
to link downside GDP risk to measures of financial imbalances based on Norwegian data.4 Downside GDP risk 
is defined as the fifth percentile of the GDP distribution. The estimate of the crisis measures based on GaR thus 
indicates a 5% probability that this estimate or weaker GDP developments will be observed.
1 See eg Jordà, Ò., M. Schularick and A.M. Taylor (2013) “When Credit Bites Back”. Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 45 (2), december, pp 3–28.
2 See Jordà, Ò. (2005) “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections”. American Economic Review, 95 (11), March, pp 161–182.
3 Based on data for 20 OECd countries back to 1975. The dataset and the dating of the financial crises are based on Anundsen, A.K, K. Gerdrup, F. Hansen 
and K. Kragh-Sørensen (2016) “Bubbles and Crises: The Role of House Prices and Credit”. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 31 (7), November/december, 
pp 1291–1311.
4 See International Monetary Fund (2017) “Is Growth at Risk?”. Global Financial Stability Report. IMF, October 2017.
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Chart 3.A Estimates of steepest fall in GDP based on different measures of
financial imbalances.1) Normalised levels of financial imbalance indicators
(horizontal scale). Steepest fall in GDP in annual percentage growth (vertical
1) Quantile regressions are applied to quantify the correlation between downside risk for mainland GDP
(fifth percentile) and various measures of financial imbalances (backdated two years). Measures of
financial imbalances are normalised based on their cumulative distribution. All estimates based on the
same indicator have the same colour. Different transformations are indicated by different shapes.
Estimates based on local projections show the pre-crisis correlation between credit indicators and GDP
developments in crises based on 20 OECD countries. 
Sources: CBRE, Dagens Næringsliv, Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, OPAK, Real Estate Norway, Statistics
Norway and Norges Bank 
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Chart 3.B Estimates for total GDP shortfall over a three-year period based on
various measures of financial imbalances.1) Normalised levels of financial
imbalance indicators (horizontal scale). Total GDP shortfall measured as
annualised percentage deviation from GDP (vertical scale).2)
1) Quantile regressions are applied to quantify the correlation between downside risk for mainland GDP
(fifth percentile) and various measures of financial imbalances (backdated three years). Measures of
financial imbalances are normalised based on their cumulative distribution. All estimates based on the
same indicator have the same colour. Different transformations are indicated by different shapes.
Estimates based on local projections show the pre-crisis correlation between credit indicators and GDP
developments in crises based on 20 OECD countries. 2) The vertical scale is inverted. 
Sources: CBRE, Dagens Næringsliv, Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, OPAK, Real Estate Norway, Statistics
Norway and Norges Bank 
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In the local projections, only the credit gap is used, ie the difference between credit relative to GDP and an 
estimated trend. In the GaR, a wider range of indicators is used, which includes credit, property prices and 
household debt service ratio. As there is considerable uncertainty attached to the measures and estimation of 
financial imbalances, several transformations of the indicators are also used, such as three-year change and 
change relative to various trends. All of Norges Bank’s indicators of financial imbalances are found to have a 
substantial impact on downward GDP risk, in particular commercial real estate prices and the household debt 
service ratio. When financial imbalances increase, estimated crisis depth is more severe.
Historical observations show that estimated GDP growth usually declines and estimated total GDP shortfall 
usually widens as the level of financial imbalances increases (Charts 3.A and 3.B). Each indicator is normalised 
based on its historical distribution in the period, resulting in the same scale for all of the indicators. The estimate 
from the local projections often indicates a more severe crisis than the estimate from GaR. This reflects the 
relative infrequency of severe financial crises.
Financial imbalances have built up over a long period
Chart 3.C shows the GDP path assumed in the 2019 stress test. The correlation between developments in 
financial imbalances and crisis depth is based on local projections and GaR. The level of the GDP paths has also 
been approximately adjusted so that the most severe events (in red) largely cover the developments observed 
in international crises for comparable countries. The level of the least severe GDP paths (in yellow) is approxi-
mately limited to zero growth in the first year and a total GDP shortfall of minus 5% in the first three years as 
a share of pre-crisis GDP. If the countercyclical capital buffer is kept at 2.5%, developments in the 2019 stress 
scenario are in the more severe portion of the fan, reflecting the build-up of financial imbalances over a long 
period. The macroeconomic scenario has been constructed by adding a series of macroeconomic shocks in 
Norges Bank’s main model NEMO. The size of the shocks is quantified to ensure that crisis depth and GDP paths 
are as shown in the chart.
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Chart 3.C Potential GDP paths in the stress scenario and variation in financial 
imbalances. Years after crisis start (horizontal scale). GDP is indexed. Year 0 = 100
Source: Norges Bank
FS2019 - with countercyclical buffer rate set at 0
FS2019 - without reduction in countercyclical buffer rate
104
43
     3 STRESS TEST – BANKS’ RESPONSE TO A PRONOUNCEd dOWNTURN
HOW DOES IFRS 9 AFFECT IMPAIRMENT RECOGNITION IN BAD TIMES?
A new accounting standard (IFRS 9) has changed the way banks recognise credit losses. Under IFRS 9, 
credit impairment shall be based on more forward-looking assessments than under the previous standard. 
The Bank has analysed how IFRS 9 may affect the path of Norwegian banks’ credit losses in a downturn. 
The results suggest that IFRS may increase impairment losses both immediately prior to and during bad 
times with higher credit risk.
IFRS 9 is intended to make impairment recognition more forward-looking
After the financial crisis erupted in 2008, the accounting rules for banks’ impairment recognition were criticised 
by the G20 leaders, authorities and investors. International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 permitted banks to 
recognise credit impairment only if there was objective evidence of a loss event. According to critics, banks’ 
impairment recognition was thus “too little, too late”.
European authorities have responded to the criticism by introducing new accounting rules, International  Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9, from January 2018. Under IFRS 9, credit impairment shall be based on more forward-
l ooking assessments by including recognition of expected credit losses. IFRS 9 is also intended to facilitate 
banks’ management of credit risk.
Under IFRS 9, loans are to be assigned to one of three stages for impairment purposes. For fresh loans, a 
provision for expected credit losses over the next 12 months must be recognised at the outset (stage 1). 
If the credit risk of a loan increases significantly, banks must recognise a provision for lifetime credit losses 
(stages 2 and 3). The largest Norwegian banks use changes in the loan’s probability of default (PD) to assess 
whether credit risk has increased significantly. Banks define their own criteria for the level of and change in 
a loan’s PD that is indicative of a significant credit risk. A loan is reclassified as stage 2 if the credit risk has 
increased significantly, but there is no objective evidence that the loan is impaired. Reclassification from 
stage 2 to stage 3 requires objective evidence of impairment, eg that a loan has been non-performing for at 
least 90 days. Since stage 3 requires objective evidence of impairment, this stage largely corresponds to 
credit losses under IAS 39.
IFRS 9 results in higher impairment losses when credit risk increases
Several studies show that IFRS 9 may result in higher impairment losses than IAS 39 when credit risk increases, 
because unlike under IAS 39, banks must, to a larger degree, recognise a provision for expected credit losses 
over the entire lifetime of a loan.1 In this situation, banks’ capital adequacy may fall faster and more sharply 
than under IAS 39.
We have performed a counterfactual analysis of credit losses on banks’ corporate exposures by applying IFRS 
9 in Norway in the period 2001–2017, with a particular focus on credit losses in bad times.2 Losses on corporate 
exposures have accounted for around three-fourths of Nordic banks’ credit losses since 2000. Estimated paths 
for credit losses under IAS 39 and IFRS 9, which are calculated using the same data set and consistent assump-
tions, form the basis for our assessments of how the transition to IFRS 9 may affect banks’ impairment losses.
1 Abad, J. and J. Suarez (2017), “Assessing the cyclical implications of IFRS 9, a recursive model”. Occasional Paper Series 12/2017. ESRB. July 2017. Krüger, 
S., d. Rösch, and H. Scheule (2018), “The impact of loan loss provisioning on bank capital requirements”, Journal of Financial Stability, 36. Pp 114–129. 
Plata, C., M. Rocamora, A. Rubio aand J. villar (2017), “IFRS 9: Pro-cyclicality of provisions. Spanish banks as an illustration”, BBVA Research.
2 See Andersen, H. og I.N. Hjelseth (2019), “How does IFRS 9 affect banks’ impairment recognition in bad times?” Staff Memo 9/2019, Norges Bank 
 (forthcoming in English), for a detailed description of the analysis.
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We calculate banks’ credit losses under IAS 39 by multiplying the bank debt of enterprises that have gone 
bankrupt or experienced financial problems by an estimate of the loss given default (LGD). Our calculations 
provide a reasonable estimate of developments in actual credit losses.
We estimate credit losses under IFRS 9 with assumptions tailored to reported practices at the largest Norwe-
gian banks. We use PD estimates from Norges Bank’s bankruptcy probability model to classify enterprise’ bank 
debt into stages 1 and 2.3 Enterprises are classified as stage 3 when they go bankrupt or experience financial 
problems. Chart 3.D shows the share of bank loans classified as stages 1, 2 and 3 with our calculations. The 
share of loans classified as stages 2 and 3 increase during the downturn in 2002–2003 and the financial crisis in 
2008–2009.
We calculate credit losses for the three stages under IFRS using the same LGD estimates we used to calculate 
the IAS 39 losses, to ensure that the loss paths are comparable. In addition, we calculate credit losses for stage 
1 using a PD estimate from the bankruptcy probability model. We adjust the PD estimates when calculating 
credit losses for stage 2 so that they reflect the probability of default of the lifetime of the loan.
Chart 3.E shows that the estimated losses under IFRS 9 are higher than the estimated IAS 39 losses both imme-
diately prior to and during the downturn in 2002–2003 and the financial crisis in 2008–2009. Overall, the estimated 
IFRS 9 losses are around a fifth higher than the estimated IAS 39 losses both immediately prior to and during 
the two downturns. The estimates also indicate that IFRS 9 may result in lower credit losses than IAS 39 in 
periods after economic downturns with increased credit risk.
Our estimated loss paths under IAS 39 and IFRS 9 are fairly similar. This may be because our losses have been 
calculated for a period that does not contain a sharp downturn with large bank losses. Credit risk will increase 
significantly on a large share of banks’ exposures during such a crisis, in which case the difference between 
losses under IFRS 9 and IAS 39 may turn out to be substantially greater.
3 See Hjelseth, I.N. and A. Raknerud (2016), “A model of credit risk in the corporate sector based on bankruptcy prediction”, Staff Memo 20/2016, Norges 
Bank, for a detailed description of the bankruptcy probability model.
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     3 STRESS TEST – BANKS’ RESPONSE TO A PRONOUNCEd dOWNTURN
ASSESSMENT OF CONTAGION EFFECTS IN THE BANKING SECTOR
Banks are interconnected inter alia through their substantial cross-holding of covered bonds. A new model 
framework analyses possible contagion effects in the Norwegian banking sector. The analysis shows funding 
problems may trigger several rounds of fire sales. The subsequent decline in securities prices, will result in losses 
in addition to those in the stress test.
Norges Bank has developed a model framework to quantify possible interbank contagion effects.1 At the current 
stage of the model, the analysis allows us to illustrate the importance of various mechanisms and highlight the 
risk of contagion. The model is based on existing academic literature2 that typically assumes that sales of 
securities by one bank leads to a drop in its price, which in turn affects everybody holding the security (indirect 
contagion) or because a counterparty in the banking system defaults (direct contagion). Banks subjected to 
indirect contagion may be affected by the situation of other banks even when not directly exposed to banks 
that default. Indirect and direct contagion can happen separately, but may also be mutually reinforcing. The 
results from the analysis provide insight into the potential influence of structural conditions in the banking 
system on systemic risk.
The starting point of Norges Bank’s analysis is that banks incur losses equivalent to those in the stress test 
(Section 3.2) with a more pronounced impact on some banks than on others. In the model, banks with high 
credit losses and weakened CET1 ratios are assumed to have funding problems owing to waning creditor and 
investor confidence. As there is considerable uncertainty regarding the magnitude of losses that will trigger 
funding problems, the model performs a large number of simulations at different thresholds of the CET1 ratio 
below which banks are assumed to face funding problems.
When banks in the model are subject to funding problems, they will seek to sell securities3 to boost liquidity 
quickly. Fire sales add to the supply of securities, which will lead to a drop in prices, giving rise to indirect con-
tagion. The decline in the prices of securities sold will depend on market liquidity in a stressed situation.4 After 
each round of fire sales, more securities may have declined in value. Banks holding these securities will incur 
further valuation losses, which may lead to more rounds of fire sales if banks experience further funding prob-
lems.
In our model, direct contagion arises if losses from fire sales lead to a bank entering resolution. Resolution is 
assumed to take place once banks’ CET1 ratios have fallen below a certain level. Banks with exposures to other 
banks, which are covered by the bail-in rules, must then bear losses or have portions of their debt converted 
into CET1 capital.5 However, the magnitude of such exposures is small.
Contagion effects are simulated in the model until banks do not need any more adjustments. Finally, the reduc-
tion in the banking sector’s CET1 ratio is estimated owing to contagion effects related to fire sales and recap-
italisation procedures.
1 A detailed description of the framework will be presented in Bjørland, C. and T. Kockerols “A macro-contagion stress test framework for Norway”. Staff 
Memo (forthcoming), Norges Bank.
2 Cont, R. and E. Schaaning (2017) “Fire sales, indirect contagion and systemic stress testing”. Working Paper 2/2017. Norges Bank. Hüser, A.-C., G. Hałaj, 
C. Kok, C. Perales and A. van der Kraaij (2017) “The systemic implications of bail-in: a multi-layered network approach”. ECB Working Paper No. 2010.
3 In the model, banks can also sell illiquid assets. Illiquid assets are sold at a discounted price that increases losses, but these sales do not result in conta-
gion to other banks in the model. We consider the uncertainty regarding the share of illiquid assets sold and the discount in our model simulations.
4 We take the uncertainty surrounding market liquidity into account and simulate from a distribution of different configurations regarding market liquidity.
5 Foreign creditors and Norwegian investors that are not included in the model are assumed to bear a portion of the losses. We consider the uncertainty 
regarding this mechanism in the model simulations. The losses incurred by these creditors are not taken into account when the losses are aggregated.
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Indirect contagion from fire sales of securities can potentially result in substantial losses
Securities account for 8% of sample banks’ total assets, 62% of which are covered bonds.6 Securities exposures 
amount to 118% of banks’ CET1 capital. This means that impairments owing to fire sales may potentially have 
a substantial impact on banks’ CET1 ratios. Banks are important covered bond investors, and the sample banks 
hold just under 40% of the outstanding value of the covered bonds they have invested in.
In the analysis, it is assumed that direct exposures that may be used in a bail-in amount to 12% of banks’ CET1 
capital.7 This assumption overstates the potential for bail-in losses, as the data do not provide information on 
whether exposures are covered by the bail-in rules. Even though the portion of exposures that can be used for 
a bail-in is overstated for the time being, the analysis shows that losses from direct contagion are small.
Chart 3.F shows a possible breakdown of losses owing to contagion effects. The breakdown reflects the varied 
importance of different mechanisms in the model owing to the large number of simulations performed.
In most of the simulations, the losses are equivalent to a reduction in banks’ CET1 ratio of about 0.5 percentage 
point, but in some cases, losses may be equivalent to a reduction in banks’ CET1 ratio of about 2 percentage 
points. The losses mainly result from indirect contagion. Losses are generally driven by a decline in the prices 
of covered bonds and central and local government bonds. Since banks have substantial exposures to these 
securities, relatively high losses may arise even in the event of a modest price decline. The more severe losses 
arise when an economic downturn forces large banks into fire sales. Losses are also higher when banks conduct 
sales without taking into account the market liquidity of the securities to be sold. The level of banks’ CET1 ratio 
that triggers funding problems was also found to be crucial to the magnitude of the losses.
Over time, structural conditions in the banking system may change, resulting in some mechanisms becoming 
more important than others. This could also affect systemic risk and the financial stability outlook.
6 Based on data from vPS at the end of 2019 Q2.
7 Based on the reporting of large exposures (CRd Iv) at the end of 2019 Q2. The exposures are after deductions (cf Section 6 of the regulation on credit 
institutions’ and investment firms’ large exposures).
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Chart 3.F Estimated probability density function of losses due to contagion
in the banking sector.1) Percentage point fall in CET1 capital ratio
1) The shaded area sums to one. The density is non-parametric and is based on 30 000 
simulations. In each simulation, one value is drawn for each of the 20 stochastic parameters in 
the model.
Sources: Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway), VPS and Norges Bank
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Climate risk is of significance for financial stability. Climate risk is related to both the physical 
impacts of climate change and the implications of the transition to lower greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Climate change is a global challenge that must primarily be addressed by the political 
authorities, using instruments other than those available to central banks. The financial system 
must at the same time adapt to climate risk. Climate risk may expose the financial system to 
credit losses, and uncertainty about climate risk exposure may result in funding problems. 
Central banks and supervisory authorities can, within their mandates, promote financial stabi-
lity by helping to pave the way for the financial sector to include climate risks in overall risk 
assessments and communicate relevant information and by ensuring that financial institutions 
have adequate capital to support all risks. For Norwegian banks and financial markets, transition 
risks, particularly related to the oil and gas industry, may be important in the years ahead.
4 Climate risk and the  
financial system
4.1 CLIMATE RISK AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY
Climate change and society’s adaptation to climate 
change will affect all segments of the economy and 
entail risks to financial stability. It has been estab-
lished with a high degree of certainty that climate 
change has occurred and will occur, and the proba-
bility of outcomes that are far more severe than the 
most likely outcomes is not negligible.1 At the same 
time, there is considerable uncertainty as to the mag-
nitude and timing of the changes, what the correct 
response is today and what the response will actually 
be. Climate risk is thus a source of market failure that 
may contribute to mispricing and inefficient resource 
allocation for society (see box on page 53).
Analyses of the economic implications of climate risk 
often make a distinction between physical risk and tran-
sition risk. Physical risk is linked to the direct impacts of 
climate change, such as temperature increases and 
more extreme weather. Transition risk is related to 
various forms of adaptation to lower emissions, such 
as changes in climate regulation, new technology and 
changing investor and consumer preferences.
For Norwegian banks, climate risk can entail loan losses, 
reputational risk and consequences for financing. For 
banks as a whole, an increase in losses on loans to the 
retail and corporate sectors will likely be the most 
important. The biggest lending risk comes from unex-
1 See NOU 2018:17. Climate risk and the Norwegian economy (Climate Risk 
Commission), page 59.
pected shifts that entail consequences for ongoing 
projects. Climate-related direct costs and losses can 
arise when climate risk is not assessed in the project 
planning. Unexpected changes in market expectations, 
consumer preferences and regulation may also occur, 
for example in the wake of climate-related natural dis-
asters. Moreover, developments in climate-friendly 
technology can reduce the cost of, and hence increase 
the probability of, abrupt tightening of regulation of old 
technology. For example, new energy sources could 
make it easier to phase out of fossil energy.
Physical risk – biggest risk from global conditions
According to Norway’s Climate Risk Commission, 
Norway’s exposure to direct physical climate change 
is limited, and its capacity to adapt is relatively good.2 
Physical risk may nevertheless affect Norwegian firms 
and households. Physical risk is often systematic, 
undiversifiable and its impact is always negative. Man-
aging this risk is challenging for financial institutions 
and other economic agents.
Global climate change can lead to an increase in 
goods and services prices, and give rise to a substan-
tial risk of escalating global conflict and new migration 
patterns.
In Norway, property, agriculture, transport, fish 
farming, tourism and other weather- and climate-de-
pendent sectors could be exposed to physical climate 
risk as a result of floods, landslides, avalanches and 
2 See NOU 2018:17. Climate risk and the Norwegian economy (Climate Risk 
Commission), page 67.
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temperature increases. The Norwegian National 
Scheme for Natural damage Assistance, which is based 
on payments from insurance undertakings, covers to 
a large extent physical damage to property.3 Large 
insurance settlements can result in higher insurance 
premiums and have implications for future regulation 
of the Scheme. An increase in insurance premiums 
may therefore be a consequence of physical climate 
risk in exposed areas, which may in turn have an impact 
on property values and lending for those areas.
Transition risk – most relevant climate risk for 
banks now
Transition risk exists in most sectors that could be 
exposed to climate regulation, emissions pricing, or 
competition from new climate-friendly technology. 
In addition, changes in customer preferences and 
investor demands can lead to unexpected shifts that 
have implications for existing projects. This could 
entail an increase in credit risk for bank lending. Since 
different agents are impacted in different ways, tran-
sition risk is unsystematic.4 Transition risk may there-
fore be diversifiable. At the same time, banks’ expo-
sures will be a reflection of the Norwegian economy 
and industry structure. This can limit Norwegian 
banks’ genuine opportunities for diversification.
3 See Finanstilsynet (2019) “Risk Outlook – June 2019”. Theme III discusses 
climate risk and the implications for insurance undertakings. The Scheme 
for Natural damage Assistance is based on payments from insurance 
undertakings, but is not risk-sensitive.
4 See NOU 2018:17. Climate Risk and the Norwegian economy (Climate Risk 
Commission), page 59.
Transition risk can lead to financing risk. Higher tran-
sition-related credit risk can lead to higher risk of loan 
losses and hence higher financing costs or shorter 
maturities for banks’ financing. Mandate changes and 
other investor demands can result in an unexpected 
shift in the willingness to finance. If funding markets 
consider that some banks are highly exposed to tran-
sition risk, their access to financing may suffer. This 
may in turn lead to reduced access to financing for 
firms and households, also for those with low transi-
tion risk. Transition risk may, like many other forms 
of risk, contribute to systemic risk.
In Norway, the oil and gas industry is the main source 
of transition-related credit risk. For the Norwegian 
economy as a whole, this risk has declined as national 
wealth has been re-allocated from petroleum 
resources to diversified foreign investments. For 
banks, risk is determined by credit exposure. The risk 
in the oil industry is related to both a possible decline 
in global oil demand and structural changes to adapt 
production. A substantial decline in oil demand as a 
result of changes in climate policy, customer prefer-
ences or technological developments likely lies many 
years ahead. Expectations of a change may never-
theless cause a shift already today, partly because 
Norwegian oil and gas fields have a long life with sub-
stantial initial investments. Return requirements for 
financing projects and companies operating in the 
oil-related industry have increased in recent years, 
and may increase further. Countries with large oil 
reserves may increase the supply of oil today in 
response to uncertainty about future oil prices. This 
could push down oil prices and weaken the debt-ser-
vicing capacity of oil-related companies in Norway.
Norwegian banks have reduce their exposure to the 
oil industry in recent years (Chart 4.1), but it remains 
important for Norwegian banks. The experience of the 
oil price decline showed that oil service companies 
were just as vulnerable to oil price movements as oper-
ators on the Norwegian shelf (see box on page 49).5
Large losses for the banks as a whole will likely occur if 
a structural decline in oil-related activities have large 
spillovers on other sectors of the economy. Banks are 
5 Note that climate risk is not the only transition risk to which this industry 
will be exposed in the coming years. Examples of other risks related to the 
Norwegian oil industry are oil discoveries on the Norwegian shelf and 
continued strong growth in US shale oil production.
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Chart 4.1 Developments in DNB’s oil-related exposures. Percent of EAD1). 
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BANKS AND THE EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM THE DOWNTURN IN THE OIL INDUSTRY
The evolution of US shale oil production over the past decade is a structural shift that has had an impact on 
Norwegian oil-related industries, requiring them to adapt. In assessing the transition risks arising from this 
shift, the experience gained from the oil price decline in 2014 may therefore be relevant.
Risk associated with banks’ oil-related lending increased following the oil price fall in 2014, particularly in the 
offshore segment. Risk weights rose for DNB’s oil, gas and offshore loans (Chart 4.A).1 Applying higher risk 
weights can be an effective tool for banks in their management of climate-related risk. The level of capital a 
bank must hold against these loans rises, inducing banks to raise the threshold for providing new loans. Higher 
risk weights can also lead to increased lending rates or tighter credit standards.
There is reason to believe that risk may be higher in a larger number of segments in a structural, climate-related 
downturn compared with a cyclical downturn. In a structural downturn, investors are less likely to inject fresh 
capital into an enterprise. The result may be lower collateral values, higher probability of default rates and 
thereby higher bank losses. Since banks’ exposure to oil-related industries make up less than 5%2 of banks’ 
total exposure at default (EAD), Norwegian banks are nonetheless well positioned to absorb such losses if these 
losses are spread over several years.3
1 Risk weights could fall if loan losses are low for a longer period.
2 At the end of 2015, oil-related exposure accounted for 5% of total EAd for the 16 largest banks, according to Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Autho-
rity of Norway). The bank with the largest nominal oil exposure, dNB, has reduced its oil-related exposures by 40% between the end of 2015 and the first 
half of 2019.
3 The loss-absorbing capacity of the banks with the highest oil-related exposure was about 21% of oil-related loans at the end of 2015 (see Hjelseth I.N., 
L.T. Turtveit and H. Winje (2016) “Bank’s credit risk associated with the oil service industry”. Economic Commentaries 5/2016. Norges Bank.
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especially vulnerable should the spillovers lead to a sharp 
fall in prices for commercial and residential property, 
which account for the largest share of banks’ lending.
Property can also be affected by transition risk 
through stricter building and energy consumption 
requirements. Commercial property renters may 
increasingly prefer energy-efficient buildings in the 
interest of their own climate reporting, reputation 
and costs. This could lead to a price fall and increased 
need for investment in older commercial properties, 
while new buildings may increase in value.
Industries that have low or no emissions pricing today 
may be exposed to transition risk further ahead. Agri-
culture and fisheries are two examples (Chart 4.2). 
Other examples are imported goods and international 
freight transport, to which Norwegian banks are 
heavily exposed. The banks will be affected by 
whether, how and how fast emissions pricing or 
requirements are phased in.
Since 2008, Norway has participated in the EU Emis-
sions Trading System (ETS). The system covers a 
number of industries, and sets a cap on total allowed 
emissions for the ETS sector, instead of regulating 
emissions for individual operators (Chart 4.2). Emis-
sion pricing is determined by emissions trading in a 
market, and the ETS allowances of each company 
determines who reduces emissions and to what 
extent. The authorities impose emissions reductions 
by reducing the total allowance over time. The price 
of emissions allowances increased sharply in the EU 
in 2018, owing to extraordinary allowance reductions6 
(Chart 4.3). The EU is planning to reduce allowances 
annually in the period to 2030. The risk of a sharp price 
rise for climate emissions constitutes a transition risk, 
particularly for companies that cannot compensate 
through selling prices. Flexible adaptation options, 
such as the choice between buying allowances and 
investing to reduce emissions, can contribute to mit-
igating transition risk.
Stricter climate requirements can hasten the intro-
duction of new technology. For some companies, this 
will entail closures or restructuring, while other may 
gain competitive advantages. Norway has access to 
climate-friendly electricity production. The transition 
to lower emissions can therefore give rise to oppor-
tunities for Norwegian companies and lower credit 
risk for some corporate exposures.
4.2 BANKS’ ADAPTATION
The attention devoted to climate risk by banks, other 
financial institutions and investors has increased. In 
2018, Finance Norway published a “Roadmap for 
Green Competitiveness in the Norwegian Financial 
Sector”. The Norwegian Climate Foundation took 
stock of the work on climate risk at the 10 largest 
banks in the Norwegian market.7 All the large banks 
reported that they had discussed climate risk at senior 
6 In 2017, EU member states agreed to reform the ETS so that a larger 
number of surplus allowances are removed from the market.
7 See Bjartnes, A., A. Jortveit, L.-H.P. Michelsen, O.A. Øvrebø and  
H. Skaugen (2018) “Klimarisiko – finans og børs”. Rapport 07/2018,  
Norsk  klimastiftelse (in Norwegian only).
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management level in the past year. Over half of the 
banks had assessed how climate risk could influence 
the banks’ business and 40% had analysed the impact 
of climate change on their loan portfolios. The banks 
are still in the initial phase of analysing climate risk 
and building expertise.
A better information basis for analysing 
climate risk
Banks have various adaptation options for reducing 
their own climate risk. Improved and more relevant 
reporting of climate risk by companies can enhance 
the information basis and support more appropriate 
pricing of climate risk. For banks, this can also help 
increase focus on such risk internally, and build inves-
tor confidence.8 Investors are likely to request such 
information. Many of the most oil-exposed banks 
have regularly described and updated risk assess-
ments of their oil exposures since the oil price decline 
in 2014. Similar actions can be used for climate risk.
Diversification and green securities can 
influence risk in loan portfolios
Banks can reduce climate risk in their loan portfolios 
in several ways. As transition risk can be diversifiable, 
banks have the option of mitigating risk by reducing 
their exposure to loans with high transition risk.
An increase in credit risk on loans to industries as a result 
of a risk of higher emissions prices can be matched by 
exposures to low-emission industries. Such industries, 
such as climate-friendly electricity production, can 
benefit from higher emissions prices. At the same time, 
there may be other risks associated with such “green” 
investments, which must be taken into account.
In recent years, a market for securities with a certified 
climate profile has emerged, referred to as green 
securities. In addition to the diversification motive, 
demand for green securities may be attributable to 
different factors, such as investor preferences and 
mandates for green securities for reasons of sustain-
ability and reputation. Moreover, investors may 
assume that investments with lower climate risk will 
8 An example of climate reporting is Bloomberg, M.R. et al. (2017) 
”Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
disclosures“. According to the TCFd recommendations, financial 
disclosures should describe governance, strategy, risk management, 
metrics and targets in connection with the company’s climate-related 
risks and opportunities. The TCFd also recommends conducting stress 
tests that illustrate how different climate scenarios are handled.
generate higher returns. A green security does not, 
however, necessarily feature lower risk. Some green 
securities are linked to new technology, which histor-
ically have entailed high risk.
For the green securities market to function well over 
time, formal and standardised requirements that can 
be evaluated should be introduced. The absence of 
such requirements can create uncertainty about 
whether green financing is actually used for cli-
mate-friendly projects. There are various certification 
schemes that classify securities as green to varying 
degrees. The classification of green investments is 
based on third-party evaluations that are conducted 
by research organisations or certification companies. 
Oslo Børs has its own list of green bonds. The EU is 
working on establishing standardised definitions, but 
they have yet to be adopted.9
4.3 RELEVANT FINANCIAL SECTOR 
MEASURES
Climate risk encompasses a broad range of conditions, 
which to a large extent lie outside of central banks’ 
area of operation and area of direct influence. Climate 
change is a global challenge, which must primarily be 
addressed by the political authorities and instruments 
other than those available to central banks. The finan-
cial system must, however, adapt to climate risk. 
Central banks and financial supervisory authorities 
cannot, within their mandates, promote financial sta-
bility by contributing to the inclusion of climate risk in 
the financial sector’s risk assessments. Climate risk 
must be managed in the same way as other risks 
facing the financial sector. Other types of risk may 
also be systematic and characterised by the fact that 
historical data have uncertain relevance for future risk. 
The instruments for strengthening banks’ resilience, 
such as capital requirements and macroprudential 
supervision, are thus basically the same as those used 
for managing other risks.
The authorities can contribute to improved 
assessment of climate risk
Managing the uncertainty associated with the mag-
nitude and effect of climate change may entail sub-
stantial costs. Simplified approaches may ignore or 
9 See European Commission (2019) ”EU Green Bond Standard“ and  
”EU taxonomy for sustainable activities“.
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overestimate climate risk. The authorities can 
promote knowledge-based public debate and help 
reduce uncertainty by setting disclosure standards. 
A common framework for information and analysis 
of climate risk can facilitate comparison and assess-
ment of climate risk in individual institutions. It can 
support more appropriate risk pricing. Such stand-
ardisation processes are underway in the EU and other 
fora. International cooperation can be useful in this 
work (see box to the left).
Climate risk should be an integral part of 
financial risk assessments
Both banks and authorities should assess the extent to 
which climate risk affects financial risks, such as credit 
risk, financing risk and systemic risk. This should be taken 
into account in risk assessments and hence into assess-
ments of whether banks have adequate capital and long-
term financing. Climate risk can entail a need to 
strengthen banks’ resilience, but a range of mechanisms 
have already been introduced to ensure that banks have 
adequate capital to cover unexpected losses.
Norwegian banks estimate risk weights using a long 
loss history, which includes loss experiences in the after-
math of the oil price decline in 2014. There is reason to 
believe that models based on historical data will not 
capture the risk associated with long-lasting structural 
changes such as climate risk. It is therefore possible that 
banks’ risk weights underestimate climate risk.
If financial institutions and analysts apply a planning 
horizon that is too short, banks may not fully take into 
account climate risk that could lie further ahead in 
time. The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority 
(Finansinspektionen) and the Bundesbank have 
expressed concern about this aspect.10
In today’s system, additional capital requirements are 
to be assessed if a bank’s credit exposure constitutes 
a systemic risk. Climate risk should be included in 
such as assessment.
Norges Bank will continue to work on how climate 
risk should be integrated into the work on financial 
stability, inter alia by participating in the Network for 
Greening the Financial System (NGFS).
10 See Finansinspektionen (2016) ”Climate change and financial stability“ 
and Bundesbank (2017) ”Behind the curve? The role of climate risks in 
banks’ risk management“.
NETWORK FOR GREENING THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
National and international cooperation can raise 
our knowledge level. The Network for Greening 
the Financial System (NGFS) is a network of central 
banks and financial supervisors from around the 
world. Its goal is to build knowledge and share best 
practices on climate risk management within the 
financial system and to promote the financing of 
investment to support sustainable developments. 
The NGFS is an arena for systematic knowl-
edge-building in this field. The NGFS was estab-
lished in 2017. Norges Bank and Finans tilsynet 
(Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) joined 
the network in 2018 and 2019 respectively.
The first NGFS comprehensive report, “A call for 
action – climate change as a source of financial 
risk”, was published in April 2019. The report con-
tains six non-binding recommendations for central 
banks and financial supervisors, calling for action 
within their mandates to 
(i) integrate climate-related risks into financial 
stability monitoring and micro-supervision, 
(ii) integrate sustainability factors into own-port-
folio management, 
(iii bridge the data gaps about climate-related 
risks, and 
(iv) build awareness and share knowledge about 
climate-related risks. 
Further recommendations urge other policy-
makers to 
(v) achieve a robust and internationally consistent 
climate and environmental disclosure frame-
work, and 
(vi) support the development of a taxonomy of 
economic activities that may be exposed to 
climate risk.
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CLIMATE RISK AND FINANCIAL MARKET FAILURE
There are aspects of climate risk that may contribute to market failure. Substantial downside risks with a 
considerable probability of extreme outcomes may contribute to mispricing, which may be amplified by 
information asymmetry. The authorities can reduce the risk of market failure by introducing regulatory 
and other requirements.
Climate risk will affect financial market assessments of projects. At the same time, it is uncertain whether 
financial markets are assessing and thereby pricing climate risk correctly. There are aspects of climate risk that 
may contribute to financial market failure. Market failure refers to situations where the market solution does 
not provide society with an efficient utilisation of available resources.
Substantial downside risks
Substantial downside risks are a typical feature of climate scenarios. These entail mispricing risks. A higher 
probability of extreme outcomes can result in a wider pricing gap between market participants and make pricing 
sensitive to new, negative information. In the short term, prices may be kept elevated because financial market 
participants take short-term positions in long-term projects.1
Substantial market participant exposures to industries where risk is underestimated and prices thereby over-
valued may have systemic effects. The Bank of England (2015)2 points out that financial markets may have 
overvalued prices in industries with a substantial climate change footprint.
Asymmetric information can lead to oversimplified assessments
Relevant information about climate risk exposure can be important in order to assess a project’s level of risk. 
Such information is difficult to find without technical expertise and detailed knowledge of the company. The 
company will therefore often have information that is not necessarily available to the investor.
When information asymmetry is substantial, market participants can rely on oversimplified assessment and 
simple indicators rather than conducting a comprehensive analysis. For example, an industry or a nationality 
might be considered a proxy for climate risk exposure, even though climate risk exposure actually varies widely 
within these designations. Alternatively, when faced with complex issues, it can be easier to reduce the exposure 
than to conduct a thorough risk assessment. Market participants such as investment funds or banks may also 
divest from investments to reflect customers’ preferences regarding investments perceived as unsustainable, 
irrespective of the actual climate risk exposure. Uncertainty about climate risk can thereby restrict access to credit 
for households and enterprises that are not to any great extent directly exposed to or a source of such risk.
1 In the financial literature, this is referred to by the term “short-termism”.
2 See Carney, M. (2015), “Breaking the tragedy of the horizon – climate change and financial stability”, speech given on 29 September 2015. Bank of 
England.
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Annex:  
The Norwegian banking sector
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Table 1  Structure of the Norwegian financial industry at 30 June 2019
Number
Lending1 
(NOK bn) 
Total assets 
(NOK bn)
Banks (excluding branches of foreign banks) 121 2 027 4 048
Branches of foreign banks 14 789 1 476
Mortgage companies (including branches of foreign companies) 33 1 937 2 325
Finance companies (including branches of foreign companies) 41 173 197
State lending institutions 3 363 375
Life insurance companies (excluding branches of foreign companies) 11 126 1 629
Non-life insurance companies (excluding branches of foreign companies) 55 3 189
NOK bn
Market value of equities and equity certificates, Oslo Børs 2 662
Outstanding domestic bond and short-term paper debt 2 242
 Issued by public sector and state-owned companies 742
 Issued by banks 345
 Issued by other financial institutions 611
 Issued by other private enterprises 225
 Issued by non-residents 319
GdP Norway (2018) 3 533
GdP mainland Norway (2018) 2 900
1 Lending to the public only, ie lending to credit institutions and foreign customers is excluded.
Sources: Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway), Oslo Børs, Statistics Norway, vPS and Norges Bank
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Table 2  Market shares1 of banks and mortgage companies in Norway at 
30 June 2019. Percent
Gross lending to Deposits from
Retail 
market9
Croporate 
 market10
Retail 
market9
Croporate 
 market10
dNB Bank2 27 30 29 35
Nordea3 10 13 7 12
Branches of foreign banks in Norway4 (excluding 
Nordea)
9 22 6 19
SpareBank 1 Alliance5 20 16 19 15
Eika Alliance6 10 7 13 8
Other savings banks7 13 10 13 9
Other commercial banks8 10 3 14 2
Total 100 100 100 100
Total (NOK bn) 2 905 1 506 1 286 730
1  The market shares are calculated by summing the balance sheet items for the institutions in the different groups. 
2  dNB Bank, dNB Boligkreditt and dNB Næringskreditt.
3  Nordea Bank AB (Publ), branch in Norway and Nordea Eiendomskreditt.
4  danske Bank, Handelsbanken, Handelsbanken Eiendomskreditt, eight other branches and one mortgage lender.
5  SpareBank 1 SR-Bank, SpareBank 1 SMN, SpareBank 1 Østlandet, SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge, the other eleven savings banks in the Sparebank 1 Alliance, Spare-
Bank 1 Boligkreditt og BN Bank, one commercial motgage lender, one mortgage lender and one other residential mortgage lender.
6  Eika Boligkreditt, Eika Kredittbank, 67 savings banks and three commercial banks which are owner of Eika Gruppen AS and three other residential mortgage 
lenders.
7 Sparebanken vest, Sparebanken vest Boligkreditt, Sparebanken Sør, Sparebanken Møre og Sparebanken Sogn og Fjordane, 13 other savings banks, seven 
 residential mortgage lenders, one mortgage lender and one hybrid covered bond mortgage company. 
8  Sbanken ASA, Santander Consumer Bank AS, Eksportfinans, Gjensidige Bank ASA, Storebrand Bank, Landkreditt Bank, 19 other commercial banks and five other 
residential mortgage lenders, Kommunalbanken and one municipal mortgage lender. 
9  The retail market comprises wage earners, pensioners, benefit recipients and students.
10 The corporate market primarily comprises non-financial private enterprises and the self-employed. 
Source: Norges Bank
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Table 3 Rating by Moody’s1, total assets, leverage ratio2, capital adequacy2 
and return on equity for Nordic and Norwegian banks at 30 June 2010. 
Consolidated figures
Credit rating
Total assets 
(NOK bn)
Leverage  
ratio (%)
Common 
Equity Tier 1 
(CET1)  
capital ratio 
(%)
Return on equity
Short- 
term
Long- 
term 2017 2018
2019 
Q1–Q2
Nordea Bank P-1 Aa3 5 765 5.0 14.8 9.5 9.7 7.2
danske Bank P-1 A2 5 004 4.4 16.6 13.6 9.8 9.0
Handelsbanken P-1 Aa2 2 863 4.5 17.1 12.3 12.8 12.8
SEB P-1 Aa2 2 684 4.6 16.6 11.7 16.3 13.2
dNB P-1 Aa2 2 879 7.1 16.5 10.8 11.7 12.7
Swedbank P-1 Aa2 2 286 4.8 16.1 15.1 16.1 15.9
SpareBank 1 SR-Bank P-1 A1 247 7.6 14.4 11 11.3 18.8
Sparebanken vest P-1 A1 198 7.0 14.7 11 11.9 14.7
SpareBank 1 SMN P-1 A1 167 7.5 15.0 11.5 12.2 19.0
Sparebanken Sør P-1 A1 126 9.0 15.0 9.7 8.5 8.6
SpareBank 1 Østlandet P-1 A1 131 7.3 16.7 10.2 10.5 16.9
SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge P-1 A1 111 7.6 15.3 12.9 12.9 22.7
1  Rating at 30 October 2019. Moody’s scale of rating: Short-term: P-1, P-2,… Long-term: Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2,…
2 The share of the interim result included in the calculation of the CET1 capital ratio varies across institutions. The higher the proportion of (positive) interim result 
included, the higher the CET1 ratio. Owing to different national rules, such as consolidation rules for life insurance companies and the Basel I transitional floor, 
CET1 capital figures are not directly comparable across jurisdictions.
Sources: Banks' quarterly reports, Moody’s and Norges Bank
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Table 4 Banks’¹ losses on loans² to various industries and sectors as a 
percentage of lending to the respective industries and sectors
Lending in 
NOK bn
Industries 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2018
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 93.6
   of which: Fish farming, hatcheries 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 14.3
Extraction of crude oil and natural gas 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.2 6.8 4.4 0.2 5.4
Manufacturing, mining and quarrying 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.2 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.1 0.3 55.0
   of which: Manufacturing 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.2 1.2 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.1 40.2
   of which: Ship and boat building 0.8 -0.1 2.7 2.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.4 8.8 0.3 6.7
    of which: Other services related to 
extraction of crude oil and natural gas
17.4 -1.4 0.2 5.7
Electricity and water supply, 
 construction 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.1 140.4
   of which: Construction 0.9 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.5 2.0 1.6 1.0 0.2 0.3 35.7
Retail trade and auto repair, hotels  
and restaurants
1.4 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.3 1.6 1.3 57.9
   of which: Retail trade and auto repair 1.6 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.3 1.9 1.5 47.5
   of which: Hotels and restaurants 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 10.3
Shipping and pipeline transport 1.4 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.4 1.8 2.5 0.3 -0.1 38.5
Other transport and communications 1.4 1.4 1.2 0.6 2.1 0.1 0.5 2.3 1.0 1.0 52.3
    of which: Supply and other sea 
transport services for offshore 
5.6 2.4 2.6 12.2
Business services and real estate ac-
tivities 
0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 410.6
   of which: Real estate activities 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 349.0
    of which: Professional, financial 
 business services
0.6 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.6 61.6
Other service industries 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 27.4
Total for all industries 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.2 881.2
Retail market 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 1 062.2
Other4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 626.3
Total 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 2 569.8
1 All banks in Norway including foreign branches. Nordea is a branch of a foreign bank from 2017. The figures do not include mortgage companies.
2 Recognised losses, excluding changes in unspecified loss provisions/collective impairment losses.
3 The changes in losses on loans to some industries between 2016 and 2017 were relatively large, primarily reflecting sizeable losses on individual exposures or 
reversals of losses for some banks.
4 Financial institutions, central government and social security administration, municipal sector and foreign sector
Source: Norges Bank
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Table 5 Loan defaults.1 All banks and covered bond mortgage companies.2  
At year–end
Year
Loan defaults.  
Percentage of lending to sector
Loan defaults.  
Percentage of lending to private sector
Households Enterprises Others Households Enterprises Others Total
1990 4.9 7.6 3.1 3.1 2.6 0.1 5.7
1991 6.3 10.2 3.1 4.1 3.4 0.1 7.5
1992 8.2 11.5 1.9 5.2 3.9 0.1 9.2
1993 6.5 10.6 0.4 4.3 3.5 0.0 7.7
1994 4.8 6.9 0.7 3.2 2.2 0.0 5.4
1995 3.7 4.6 0.3 2.4 1.5 0.0 3.9
1996 2.8 3.3 0.4 1.9 1.0 0.0 2.9
1997 2.1 2.1 0.2 1.4 0.7 0.0 2.1
1998 1.5 1.3 0.1 0.9 0.4 0.0 1.4
1999 1.3 1.5 0.1 0.9 0.5 0.0 1.4
2000 1.3 1.4 0.1 0.8 0.5 0.0 1.3
2001 1.3 1.7 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.0 1.4
2002 1.3 3.5 0.1 0.8 1.1 0.0 2.0
2003 1.1 3.2 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.0 1.7
2004 0.8 1.8 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.1
2005 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.8
2006 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.6
2007 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.5
2008 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.8
2009 1.1 1.6 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.3
2010 1.2 1.8 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.0 1.4
2011 1.0 1.9 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.0 1.3
2012 1.0 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.0 1.2
2013 0.9 1.8 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.2
2014 0.8 1.5 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.0 1.0
2015 0.7 1.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.9
2016 0.7 1.5 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.9
2017 0.7 1.4 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.9
2018 0.5 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5
1 Non-performing loans to 2008, 90 days or more past due, 2009–2017, 30 days or more past due and from 2018, 90 days or more past due.  
2 Covered bond mortgage companies included from 2005.
Source: Norges Bank
NORGES BANK
Bankplassen 2, P.O. Box 1179 Sentrum, N-0107 Oslo
www.norges-bank.no
Financial Stability Report 2019
